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DECEPTION, DEGENERATION, AND THE 
DELEGATION OF DUTY:  CONTRACTING 
SAFETY OBLIGATIONS BETWEEN THE NCAA, 
MEMBER INSTITUTIONS, AND STUDENT-
ATHLETES 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“At the end of the day it’s football, you only got so many 
opportunities, so I’m not going to let a little throw up[] 
keep me out of the game, you know, ‘cause the game’s 
on the line, everybody—I think . . . a lot of my 
teammates—they would’ve done the same thing.”—
Jordan Matthews1  
Jordan Matthews vomits immediately after slamming his head 
against the turf in the 2013 season opener against Ole Miss.2  The 
announcers praise advances in concussion protocol and Jordan’s 
performance that night, convinced he would not be returning.3  
However, Vanderbilt could not afford to have their best player benched 
with three minutes to go in the fourth quarter and just a four-point 
deficit.4  The game was on the line and Jordan’s team needed him.5 
Remarkably, despite never undergoing concussion testing, Matthews 
reenters just moments later.6  According to Vanderbilt, aside from the 
                                                 
1 VUCommodores, Townsend, Matthews & Woestmann - Austin Peay Week (Sept. 2, 2013), 
YOUTUBE (Sept. 2, 2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2HBuIBlVTS0&feature 
=youtu.be, archived at https://perma.cc/QUB2-KFVE. 
2 See SEC Football Games, Vanderbilt vs Ole Miss 2013 FULL GAME HD (Sept. 2, 2013), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YylkXvMfr_o, archived at https://perma.cc/3ANH-
JT34 (showing the ESPN televised broadcast of the Ole Miss Rebels facing the Vanderbilt 
Commordes at home on Aug. 29, 2013). 
3 Id. 
4 See Jason Kirk, Vanderbilt’s Jordan Matthews Vomits on the Field, Then Makes This Clutch 
Catch, SB NATION (Aug. 30, 2013), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/ 
2013/8/30/4674808/jordan-matthews-catch, archived at http://perma.cc/MWY-8MCN 
(referring to Jordan Matthews as the Commodores’ best player); SEC Football Games, supra 
note 2 (showing Vanderbilt down 32–28 with 3:12 left when the injury occurred). 
5 See VUCommodores, supra note 1 (providing video of Matthews’ “heroics” in the 
defining moments of the game); Jeff Lockridge & Nick Cole, Vanderbilt Receiver Explains 
Why He Got Sick on Field, USA TODAY (Aug. 30, 2013, 10:18 AM), http://www.usatoday. 
com/story/sports/ncaaf/sec/2013/08/30/jordan-matthews-vomit-vanderbilt-cramps/273 
7197/, archived at http://perma.cc/6NEQ-TZ7Y (quoting Matthews saying, “[i]t was tough, 
but I knew I couldn’t come out because my team needed me”). 
6 Sam Mellinger, Death of Derek Sheely Shows Football’s Concussion Problems Extend Beyond 
NFL, KANSAS CITY STAR (Aug. 31, 2013, 11:41 PM), available at http://www.kansas 
city.com/news/local/article326476/Death-of-Derek-Sheely-shows-football%E2%80%99s-
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concussion inducing hit and subsequent illness, he exhibited no 
concussion symptoms.7  Thus, it was impetuously determined that 
mandatory concussion testing was unnecessary and Jordan Matthews 
was cleared to play.8  Through its inaction, Vanderbilt decidedly 
evidenced its priorities.9 
Matthews felt compelled to return to the game, uninterested in 
determining what induced his sudden illness.10  Likewise, Vanderbilt 
coach James Franklin vehemently contended that he would never put his 
player’s health in jeopardy, yet conceded that Matthews was crucial to 
Vanderbilt’s success.11  Finally, Jordan Matthews’ last line of defense, the 
medical staff, neglected to perform any precautionary tests even though 
he undeniably displayed concussion symptoms.12  It is this very 
                                                                                                             
concussion-problems-extend-beyond-NFL.html, archived at http://perma.cc/9S9W-A9K3; 
Barry Petchesky, Jordan Matthews Hit His Head, Vomited, and Stayed in the Game, DEADSPIN 
(Aug. 30, 2013, 8:49 AM), http://deadspin.com/jordan-matthews-hit-his-head-vomited-
and-stayed-in-th-1226545337, archived at http://perma.cc/8KEE-T9D6; see also SEC Football 
Games, supra note 2  (displaying Matthews returning after only one play, which baffles the 
announcers). 
7 See Associated Press, Jordan Matthews:  No Concussion, ESPN (Sept. 3, 2013, 5:29 PM), 
http://espn.go.com/college-football/story/_/id/9631350/vanderbilt-receiver-jordan-
matthews-says-concussion, archived at http://perma.cc/4EP-DQ9Z [hereinafter Jordan 
Matthews:  No Concussion] (reiterating that Matthews stated the medical staff “knew that 
there were no concussions symptoms”). 
8 See Chase Goodbread, James Franklin Defends Handling of Jordan Matthews’ Health, NFL 
(Sept. 3, 2013, 12:46 PM), http://www.nfl.com/news/story/0ap1000000237703/article/ 
james-franklin-defends-handling-of-jordan-matthews-health, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
VK7T-M3LE (quoting former Vanderbilt coach, James Franklin, in his insistence that Jordan 
Matthews was properly cleared to play); VUCommodores, supra note 1 (showing Jordan 
Matthews contending that he definitely did not have a concussion); cf. Timothy Bella, 
Explore:  College Football Concussion Map, ALJAZEERA AM. (Dec. 27, 2013), http://america. 
aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2013/9/3/america-
tonight-s201314collegefootballconcussiondatabase.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
Q3HU-B4YL (illustrating that Vanderbilt did not report a single concussion as of December 
27, 2013).  In the 2013 season, only 192 concussions were reported among 10,000 players; 
which, according to the NCAA’s Injury Surveillance Program, should be closer to 4,000 
reported concussions per year.  Timothy Bella, NCAA Head Games:  The ‘Very Skewed’ 
Concussion Data in College Football, ALJAZEERA AM. (Jan. 9, 2014, 5:30 PM), 
http://america.aljazeera.com/watch/shows/america-tonight/america-tonight-blog/2014 
/1/9/ncaa-head-games-theveryskewedconcussiondataincollegefootball.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/C8G5-Y3F2.  Interestingly, of those 192, not a single Vanderbilt player 
was reported to have sustained a concussion.  Id. 
9 See, e.g., Petchesky, supra note 6 (criticizing Matthew’s lack of recovery time). 
10 Teresa M. Walker, Vandy Receiver Insists He’s Fine After Hard Hit, ASSOCIATED PRESS 
(Sep. 3, 2013, 4:32 PM), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/vandy-receiver-insists-hes-fine-
after-hard-hit, archived at http://perma.cc/32KK-FTBP. 
11 Jordan Matthews:  No Concussion, supra note 7. 
12 Chris Huston, Vanderbilt’s Jordan Matthews Says He’s OK After Hit, NBC SPORTS (Sept. 
3, 2013, 7:33 PM), http://collegefootballtalk.nbcsports.com/2013/09/03/vanderbilts-
jordan-matthews-says-hes-ok-after-hit/, archived at http://perma.cc/L4UZ-PEV9; see also 
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dichotomic situation that exemplifies the National Collegiate Athletic 
Association’s (“NCAA”) flawed NCAA Concussion Policy and 
Legislation (“Concussion Policy”).13 
This Note analyzes the current NCAA Concussion Policy’s 
ineffectiveness.14  It argues that the NCAA’s effort to relieve itself from 
legal liability through its contractual relationship with universities that 
are members of the NCAA (“member institutions”) is not only greatly 
flawed, but seriously endangering the welfare of the student-athletes.15  
To rectify this social wrong, the NCAA should redraft its Concussion 
Policy to incentivize student-athletes to disclose concussion symptoms, 
employ independent medical personnel to be present at every NCAA 
sanctioned football game, and establish an oversight body to ensure 
enforcement of the proposed policy.16 
First, Part II illustrates the NCAA’s pervasive failure with historical, 
legal, medical, and social background of the intercollegiate concussion 
controversy.17  Next, Part III assesses the inadequacy of the current 
NCAA Concussion Policy, specifically examining the NCAA’s failed 
performance of its promise to protect student-athletes as third-party 
beneficiaries of the NCAA and member institution’s contract.18  Last, 
Part IV proposes redrafting the current NCAA Concussion Policy, 
requiring independent medical personnel to be present at each game, 
and establishing an outside monitoring system to ensure proper 
implementation.19  Unquestionably, the NCAA’s unenforced and 
ineffective Concussion Policy must be restructured to alleviate the 
medical, social, and legal implications currently plaguing college 
football, leaving nearly seventy thousand athletes defenseless.20 
                                                                                                             
SEC Football Games, supra note 2 (providing the announcers’ reaction to Matthews’ injury 
with stating that anyone on a medical staff knows vomiting is the first indication of a 
concussion). 
13 See infra Part II (demonstrating the conflicting incentives in intercollegiate football that 
impede success of the NCAA Concussion Policy). 
14 See infra Part III (analyzing the NCAA’s current, ineffective concussion policy). 
15 See infra Part II (establishing the contractual relationship, while illustrating its 
troubling application). 
16 See infra Part IV (suggesting an outside governing body, independent medical 
personnel, and redrafting of the current language). 
17 See infra Part II (providing background, which evidences the need for an improved 
monitoring system). 
18 See infra Part III (assessing the current system’s shortcomings). 
19 See infra Part IV (concluding that the issues surrounding the current NCAA 
Concussion Policy can only be resolved through third-party enforcement and redrafting of 
the current plan). 
20 ERIN IRICK, NAT'L COLL. ATHLETIC ASS'N, NCAA SPORTS SPONSORSHIP & 
PARTICIPATION RATES REP.:  1981–1982–2011–2012, 72 (2012), available at http://www.ncaa 
publications.com/productdownloads/PR2013.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/DRK2-
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II.  BACKGROUND 
“From the President of the United States to the humblest member of 
a . . . college faculty there arises a general protest against this boy-killing, 
man-mutilating, money-making, gladiatorial sport.”21  Death and injury 
has plagued intercollegiate football since its creation, thus necessitating 
continuous regulation of the sport.22  The NCAA was established as a 
result of this exigency.23  Ironically, the Association has recently endured 
extensive criticism for its inconsistent regulation and erroneous 
protection of student-athletes.24  Just as was the case in the beginning, 
societal recognition and presidential condemnation of gridiron violence 
has since led the NCAA to reassess safety standards for athletes.25  
However, the NCAA’s failure to enforce its concussion policy has left it 
susceptible to further denunciation and legal liability.26 
                                                                                                             
36AA; see Andy Staples, The Price of Head Injuries, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Oct. 24, 2013), 
http://mmqb.si.com/2013/10/24/nfl-draft-concussions-jahvid-best/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/TJ8A-SWNJ (cautioning the desire to hide a concussion so to not hinder 
the probability of playing in the NFL). 
21 Taming Football, in 10 THE WORLD TO-DAY 3 (Shalier Mathews, ed. 1906). 
22 Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic Association’s Role in 
Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 10–11 (2000). 
23 JOSEPH N. CROWLEY, IN THE ARENA:  THE NCAA'S FIRST CENTURY 1, 9 (2006). 
24 See Nathan Fenno, Internal NCAA Emails Raise Questions About Concussion Policy, 
WASH. TIMES (Jul. 20, 2013, 2:33 PM), http://www.washingtontimes.com/blog/screen-
play/2013/jul/20/internal-ncaa-emails-raise-questions-about-concuss/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NCZ2-NUBL [hereinafter Emails Raise Questions] (discussing the way the 
NCAA handles head injuries). 
25 JACKSON LEWIS LLP, CONCUSSIONS IN ATHLETES:  WHERE WE ARE AND WHAT TO DO 
NOW? 3, 4 (Jan. 2010), available at www.naia.org/fls/27900/1NAIA/resources/trainers/ 
NAIA_ConcussionsinAthletesSpecialReport.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ZZ9R-
WGVV; Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24; see John Breech, President Obama:  I Wouldn’t 
Let My Son Play Pro Football, CBS SPORTS (Jan. 19, 2014, 2:14 PM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/nfl/eye-on-football/24414125/president-obama-i-wouldnt-let 
-my-son-play-pro-football, archived at http://perma.cc/7LYW-5YHS (quoting President 
Obama who states, “if I had a son, I’d have to think long and hard before I let him play 
football”); see also Memorandum in Support of Motion for Class Certification at 10, 
Arrington v. NCAA, No. 11-cv-06356 (N.D. Ill. July 19, 2013), available at 
http://sports.cbsimg.net/images/blogs/ncaa-concussions-2013-memo.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/PPC2-9TSW [hereinafter Arrington Memo] (providing the NCAA’s 
acknowledgement of concussion management at the various other levels); THE LYSTEDT 
LAW:  A CONCUSSION SURVIVOR’S JOURNEY, CTR. DISEASE CONTROL (Mar. 12, 2010), 
http://www.cdc.gov/media/subtopic/matte/pdf/031210-Zack-story.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/J7SS-9VCP (demonstrating that youth football has also employed 
guidelines for safer play); Gary Mihoces, NFL Launches New Guidelines for Assessing 
Concussions, USA TODAY (Mar. 30, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/ 
football/nfl/2011-03-29-concussions-protocol_N.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/M3Z9-
GYZH (outlining changes the NFL has implemented). 
26 Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24. 
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This Part explores the NCAA’s largely criticized concussion 
management protocol by contextualizing the history and governance 
structure of the NCAA, the nuances of a head injury, as well as the social 
complexities involved in intercollegiate football.27  Part II.A provides 
background on the NCAA and its governance structure, which has given 
rise to legal liability, as well as explores the history of the NCAA’s 
current concussion legislation.28  Part II.B discusses the epidemiology of 
a concussion, which further evidences the current Concussion Policy’s 
impracticalities.29  Finally, Part II.C presents the conflicting socio-
ecological concerns that hinder concussion reporting.30 
A. Two Curable Evils in American Life:  Lynchings and Football 
At the turn of the century, the American public sought to accomplish 
the now unimaginable—outlaw and abolish football.31  In fact, the New 
York Times published an editorial that strongly advocated for this 
movement by associating college football with lynching.32  The campaign 
to eliminate the sport arose after eighteen college athletes died in just one 
season.33  As a result, the NCAA was formed to mitigate the increased 
danger and nullify the subsequent crusade to eradicate football.34  It is 
argued, however, that the Association has since disassociated from its 
founding principal.35  Next, Part II.A.1 establishes the NCAA’s 
                                                 
27 See infra Part II (providing the history of concussions in the NCAA and the dangers 
posed to student-athletes). 
28 See infra Part II.A (examining the NCAA’s establishment and transformation). 
29 See infra Part II.B (detailing the physiology of a concussion). 
30 See infra Part II.C (establishing the contradicting motives of coaches, student-athletes, 
and medical personnel). 
31 Bob Greene, The President Who Saved Football, CNN (Feb. 5, 2012, 8:25 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2012/02/05/opinion/greene-super-bowl/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/QA5G-G9NX. 
32 John J. Miller, How Teddy Roosevelt Saved Football, N.Y. POST (Apr. 17, 2011, 4:00 AM), 
available at http://nypost.com/2011/04/17/how-teddy-roosevelt-saved-football/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/V26M-JZC2 (quoting the 1903 N.Y. Times headline regarding the “two 
curable evils”).  “The New York Times fussed over football’s trend toward ‘mayhem and 
homicide’ . . . [t]he first evil it addressed was the lynching of blacks[, t]he second was 
football.”  Id. 
33 CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 9; Smith, supra note 22.  In addition to the deaths, 149 
serious injuries arose out of the 1905 season alone.  CROWLEY, supra. 
34 CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 1; see also Mary Grace Miller, Comment, The NCAA and the 
Student-Athlete:  Reform is on the Horizon, 46 U. RICH. L. REV. 1141, 1141–42 (2012) 
(elaborating on the early years of the NCAA and the reasons for its formation); St. Nicholas 
Stars, Notable Educators Meet to Discuss the Uplifting of College Athletics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 
1909), available at http://query.nytimes.com/mem/archive-free/pdf?res=FB0813FC3E5D 
12738DDDAA0894D9405B898CF1D3, archived at http://perma.cc/YDS8-D4RJ (conferring 
the original intent for the NCAA). 
35 See, e.g., Miller, supra note 34, at 1141–42 (illustrating the NCAA’s focal shift from 
safety to amateurism). 
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precarious governance scheme and the legal relationships that arise from 
the Association’s legislation.36  Then, Part II.A.2 examines the NCAA’s 
reliance on its governance structure to perpetuate its longstanding 
disregard for player safety, as well as discusses the current legal battles 
plaguing the NCAA.37 
1. The 12th Man 
The NCAA is a “membership-driven organization dedicated to 
safeguarding the well-being of student-athletes and equipping them 
with the skills to succeed on the playing field, in the classroom and 
throughout life.”38  It is comprised of over 1000 member institutions with 
more than 400,000 athletes competing in three separate divisions.39  The 
Association regulates intercollegiate athletics by enacting, supervising, 
and enforcing legislation contained in its Constitution and bylaws.40  
Each division’s NCAA Division Manual outlines the Association’s 
legislation and operates as a legal contract between the NCAA and 
member institutions.41  Compliance with NCAA legislation is regulated 
by a self-reporting system, which entrusts member institutions with 
exposing their own infractions to the Association by fully disclosing all 
information requested by the NCAA’s formal investigating staff.42 
                                                 
36 See infra Part II.A.1 (providing the interworking of the NCAA governance structure 
and legal implications). 
37 See infra Part II.A.2 (elaborating on the NCAA Concussion Policy’s defectiveness and 
subsequent lawsuits). 
38 About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/5L89-PH2K. 
39 NCAA MEMBERSHIP REPORT:  2008–09, NCAA, 5 (2009); see also NCAA College Athletics 
Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN (Apr. 26, 2014), http://www.statisticbrain.com/ncaa-college-
athletics-statistics/, archived at http://perma.cc/9W4U-E776 (calculating a total of 420,000 
NCAA student-athletes as of May 8, 2012). 
40 NCAA ACADEMIC AND MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF, 2014–2015 NCAA DIV. I MANUAL 
viii, art. 1.2 (Jan. 2015), available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/productdownloads/ 
D115JAN.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/SAN9-E9DE [hereinafter DIVISION I MANUAL]. 
41 Connor J. Bush, The Legal Shift of the NCAA’s “Big 5” Member Conferences to Independent 
Athletic Associations:  Combining NFL and Conference Governance Principles to Maintain the 
Unique Product of College Athletics, 16 U. DENV. SPORTS & ENT. L. J. 5, 11 (2014); see Knelman 
v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 715 (D. Vt. 2012) (referring to the relationship 
between the NCAA and member institutions as contractual in nature); Oliver v. NCAA, 
920 N.E.2d 203, 211 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2008) (specifying that a contract unquestionably 
exists between the NCAA and member institutions). 
42 CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 83.  However, the Association has safeguarded this system 
by also enacting a formal process responsible for formal investigations of rule violations.  
Maureen A. Weston, NCAA Sanctions:  Assigning Blame Where It Belongs, 52 B.C. L. Rev. 551, 
563 (2011). 
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In fact, everyone within an institution’s athletic program is 
contractually obligated to expose potential violations.43  In addition to 
requirements under the Division I Manual, failure to report infractions is 
also a violation of the NCAA’s Certification of Compliance for Staff 
Members of Athletic Departments form and can subject an institution to 
fines, loss of scholarships, or in extreme cases, removal from the 
NCAA.44  Student-athletes also benefit from this contractual relationship 
between the NCAA and member institutions.45 
The NCAA and member institution’s contractual relationship 
extends to student-athletes under several legal theories.46  As third-party 
beneficiaries, student-athletes may enforce assurances made under the 
Constitution and bylaws.47  Although courts have determined a third-
                                                 
43 NCAA, Certification of Compliance for Staff Members of Athletic Dept’s 1 (2014), available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/DI%20Form%2014-2%20-%20Certification%20 
of%20Compliance%20for%20Staff%20Members%20of%20Athletics%20Departments.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/AN4Y-HXCN. 
44 Rodney K. Smith, Increasing Presidential Accountability in Big-Time Intercollegiate 
Athletics, 10 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 297, 316 (2003); DUQ. U., Investigating and Reporting 
NCAA Violations 1, available at http://grfx.cstv.com/photos/schools/duqu/genrel/ 
auto_pdf/violations.pdf (last visited Sept. 6, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/4CBB-X9UJ 
[hereinafter Investigating and Reporting NCAA Violations]. 
45 See Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 200 (noting the contract between the NCAA and member 
instructions in discussing student-athletes third-party beneficiary status); Joel Eckert, 
Student-Athlete Contract Rights in the Aftermath of Bloom v. NCAA, 59 VAND. L. REV. 905, 910 
(2006) (stating that Bloom “marked the first time that a court acknowledged unequivocally 
that student-athletes have contract rights under the NCAA Constitution and bylaws”). 
46 See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 624 (Colo. App. 2004) (finding third-party 
beneficiary status); Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796 (1997) (identifying a promissory 
estoppel claim); Arrington v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 11-cv-06356, at 74–94 (N.D. Ill. 
Feb. 12, 2013) [hereinafter Second Amended Class Action Complaint] (alleging several 
contract claims). 
47 See Fellheimer v. Middlebury Coll., 869 F. Supp. 238, 242 (D. Vt. 1994) (finding that a 
college has an obligation to act in a manner consistent with the terms of the Handbook).  
Moreover, additional documents may be incorporated if specifically referenced in the 
contract.  See Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 570 F. App'x 66, 68 (2d Cir. 2014) (citing 
Newton v. Smith Motors, Inc., 175 A.2d 514, 516 (1961)) (“‘[A] contract may be reached 
with reference to another writing, and the other document, or so much of it as is referred 
to, will be interpreted as a part of the main instrument,’ but ‘the extrinsic writing must be 
connected by specific reference or by such mutual knowledge and understanding.’”).  See 
generally Leslie E. Wong, Comment, Our Blood, Our Sweat, Their Profit:  Ed O'Bannon Takes 
on the NCAA for Infringing on the Former Student-Athlete's Right of Publicity, 42 TEX. TECH L. 
REV. 1069, 1074 (2010) (defining a third-party beneficiary).  The athlete’s right to enforce 
any promise is contingent upon the original contracting parties’ intent.  See generally 
Hairston v. Pac. 10 Conference, 101 F.3d 1315, 1320 (9th Cir. 1996) (articulating intent 
analysis).  An individual attempting to show status as a third-party beneficiary cannot 
simply illustrate that he will benefit from performance of the contract, but must specifically 
demonstrate that the contracting parties intended to bestow a benefit upon him.  McCarthy 
v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362 (1st Cir. 1994). 
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party beneficiary status arises under the NCAA legislation, the finding 
has been confined to claims arising out of enforcement of eligibility 
requirements.48  This conclusion is based upon the notion that “member 
institutions agree to let the NCAA set the criteria and to abide by the 
NCAA’s final eligibility decision.”49  In turn, the student-athlete stands 
to directly benefit from the contract’s performance; therefore, he acquires 
rights under the agreement, as well as the ability to enforce the contract’s 
promises once the rights have vested.50 
Student-athletes, as third-party beneficiaries, may also bring a claim 
of good faith and fair dealing.51  The covenant of good faith is an 
“implied-in-law promise not to do anything to undermine or destroy 
[the plaintiff’s] rights to receive the benefit of the 
parties’ . . . agreement.”52  Negligence or refusal to fulfill a contractual 
obligation rises to the level of bad faith if it is prompted by an interested 
or sinister motive.53 
Under 2014–2015 NCAA Division I Manual (“Division I Manual”), 
the NCAA articulates a commitment to the well-being of student-
athletes.54  The Association effectuates this promise through 
“uphold[ing] the principle of institutional control of, and responsibility 
for, all intercollegiate sports in conformity with the constitution and 
                                                 
48 Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 715.  See generally Hall, 985 F. Supp. at 797 (exemplifying a 
successful third-party beneficiary claim against the NCAA). 
49 Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (citing Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d at 200). 
50 Id.  In considering whether terms gives rise to an intentional benefit, courts employ an 
objective analysis of the contract language, as well as evaluate extrinsic evidence 
interpreting that language, and all surrounding circumstances.  Huff v. FirstEnergy Corp., 
957 N.E.2d 3, 9 (2011).  Put differently, courts consider whether “circumstances indicate 
that the promisee intend[ed] to give the beneficiary the benefit of the promised 
performance.”  Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 714.  Once intent is established and the student-
athlete’s rights have vested, the NCAA and member institutions are bound to perform their 
contractual obligations.  Oliver, 920 N.E.2d at 200.  See generally Olson v. Etheridge, 686 
N.E.2d 563, 570 (1997) (explaining that vesting occurs if the beneficiary knows of and has 
detrimentally relied on the rights, has expressly assented to the contract at the request of 
one of the parties, or if the beneficiary files a lawsuit to enforce the contract). 
51 See Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 716 (elaborating on the duty of good faith). 
52 Id. (citations omitted). 
53 Id. at 714. 
54 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 348.  Under Article 20.9.1.6 of the Division I 
Manual, the NCAA asserts its commitment to student-athlete well-being.  Id.  The 
Association directs:  “Intercollegiate athletics programs shall be conducted in a manner 
designed to enhance the well-being of student-athletes who choose to participate . . . .  Each 
member institution should also provide an environment that fosters fairness, 
sportsmanship, safety, honesty and positive relationships between student-athletes and 
representatives of the institution.”  Id. (emphasis added).  For purposes of efficiency, this 
Note will concentrate on legislation contained in the Division I Manual. 
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bylaws of th[e] Association.”55  The NCAA further delineates that 
“student-athletes rightfully assume that those who sponsor 
intercollegiate athletics have taken reasonable precautions to minimize 
the risks of injury from athletics participation.”56  To effectuate its role in 
minimizing the risk of injuries, the NCAA ensures member institutions 
implement and enforce the Association’s legislation and subject 
noncompliant members to the infractions process.57  In regard to 
compliance with the NCAA’s Concussion Protocol, the NCAA 
articulates, “[a] violation of [the protocol] shall be considered an 
institutional violation per Constitution 2.8.1.”58  However, prior to 2010, 
legislation specific to concussions was omitted from the NCAA’s 
Division I Manual.59 
                                                 
55 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 1.2(b); see id. at art. 1.3.2 (“Member 
institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this legislation, and the infractions 
process of the Association shall be applied to an institution when it fails to fulfill this 
obligation.”); id. at art. 2.8.2 (“The Association shall assist the institution in its efforts to 
achieve full compliance with all rules and regulations and shall afford the institution, its 
staff and student-athletes fair procedures in the consideration of an identified or alleged 
failure in compliance.”); id. at art. 2.8.3 (“An institution found to have violated the 
Association’s rules shall be subject to such disciplinary and corrective actions as may be 
determined by the Association.”).  The NCAA revised Article 1.3.2 on July 31, 2014, which 
previously read:  “Member institutions shall be obligated to apply and enforce this 
legislation, and the enforcement procedures of the Association shall be applied to an institution 
when it fails to fulfill this obligation.”  Compare DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 
1.3.2, with NCAA ACADEMIC AND MEMBERSHIP AFFAIRS STAFF, 2013–2014 NCAA DIVISION I 
MANUAL art. 1.3.2 (July 2013) (on file with author) (emphasis added).  See generally Gene 
Marsh & Marie Robbins, Weighing the Interests of the Institution, the Membership and 
Institutional Representatives in an NCAA Investigation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 667, 668–69 (2003) 
(discussing the toll an institutional violation has on football programs). 
56 DAVID KLOSSNER, 2013–14 NCAA SPORTS MEDICINE HANDBOOK 2, 63 (Aug. 2013), 
available at http://www.ncaapublications.com/DownloadPublication.aspx?download= 
MD13.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7YS-QQJE [hereinafter MEDICINE HANDBOOK].  
Ultimately, the NCAA contends that everyone involved in intercollegiate athletics shares 
responsibility to reduce the risk of injury during competition.  Id.  The Association collects 
data and contributes recommendations to modify safety guidelines or rules of play to 
ensure safety.  Id. 
57 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 1.2(b) (“The purposes of this Association 
are . . . [t]o uphold the principle of institutional control of, and responsibility for, all 
intercollegiate sports in conformity with the constitution and bylaws of this Association.”). 
58 MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 63; see also infra note 67 and accompanying text 
(establishing shall as a mandatory, rather than directory, term). 
59 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11 (indicating that it was enacted in 2010); see 
also JACKSON LEWIS LLP, supra note 25 (providing that “[f]or years, the NCAA’s guidance in 
the area of concussion management has been a few pages in the NCAA Sports Medicine 
Handbook”). 
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2. The Castro of College Athletics 
The NCAA is currently experiencing the most threatening coup 
d'état of its 100-year reign.60  Its constituents are tirelessly attempting to 
overthrow its amateurism ideology, while seeking greater autonomy.61  
In doing so, the most prominent governing body in all of sports has been 
publically disgraced as a self-serving dictatorship.62  Ironically, the 
governmental body responsible for protecting player health and safety is 
now associated with a form of leadership notorious for its brutality.63  
Accordingly, players have initiated lawsuits as a result of the NCAA’s 
continued failure to secure their safety.64  Unfortunately, the NCAA has 
demonstrated a history of disingenuous efforts to create an illusion of 
protection, while attempting to negate its longstanding disregard for an 
athlete’s overall well-being.65 
                                                 
60 See Stephen F. Ross et al., Judicial Review of NCAA Eligibility Decisions:  Evaluation of the 
Restitution Rule and a Call for Arbitration, 40 J.C. & U.L. 79, 96–97 (2014) (evaluating the 
impracticability of the NCAA’s restitution rule in regards to student-athlete’s eligibility); 
Peter Torncello & Gregg E. Clifton, Concussion Injuries Controversy Not Restricted to 
Professional Athletics, C. & PROF. SPORTS L. BLOG (Jan. 15, 2014), http://www.collegeand 
prosportslaw.com/amateur-sports/concussion-injuries-controversy-not-restricted-to-
professional-athletics/, archived at http://perma.cc/RL2Q-PWAA (noting that the NCAA 
is involved in numerous lawsuits due to its alleged negligence). 
61 See Dave Jamieson & Emily Swanson, Public Backs College Football Players’ Grievances, 
But Not Their Union, HUFF. POST (Feb. 15, 2014, 8:42 AM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/02/15/college-football-players-union_n_4790136. 
html?&ncid=tweetlnkushpmg00000067, archived at http://perma.cc/7FXZ-N4CS 
(contextualizing Northwestern’s attempt to form a union to bargain for medical coverage 
and scholarship terms). 
62 Dave Zirin, ‘Right Now the NCAA is Like a Dictatorship’:  Why the Northwestern Football 
Team Formed a Union, NATION (Jan. 28, 2014, 11:07 PM), http://www.thenation.com/ 
blog/178142/right-now-ncaa-dictatorship-why-northwestern-football-team-formed-union, 
archived at http://perma.cc/KAA2-KUJC. 
63 WALTER T. CHAMPION, JR., FUNDAMENTALS OF SPORTS LAW 339 (2d ed. 2004).  See 
generally Susana Narotzky, The Project in the Model:  Reciprocity, Social Capital, and the Politics 
of Ethnographic Realism, 48 CURRENT ANTHROPOLOGY 403, 407 (2007) (conveying the 
suppression of rights that stem from a dictatorial government); see c.f. Milan W. Svolik, 
Power Sharing and Leadership Dynamics in Authoritarian Regimes, 53 AM. J. POL. SCI. 477, 477 
(2009) (identifying Fidel Castro as the former dictator Cuba, retiring after fifty years in 
power). 
64 See Teddy Greenstein, Kain Colter:  Man Meets Moment, CHI. TRIB. (Feb. 15, 2014), 
available at http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2014-02-15/sports/ct-kain-colter-college-
union-spt-0216-20140216_1_kain-colter-northwestern-capa, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
D8AL-B7VF (delineating the lawsuit filed against the NCAA for neglecting to ensure 
player safety). 
65 See infra Part II.A.2 (exploring the history of NCAA concussion management). 
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On August 12, 2010, the Association enacted the NCAA Concussion 
Management Plan (“Concussion Plan”).66  The Concussion Plan 
mandates that “[a]n active member institution shall have a Concussion 
Management Plan for its student-athletes.”67  Additionally, each 
institution is responsible for drafting a plan, implementing the plan, and 
ensuring compliance on behalf of the entire institution.68  
Noncompliance is considered an institutional violation and subject to 
                                                 
66 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17.  NCAA Approach to Concussions:  
Behind the Blue Disk, NCAA, https://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/ncaa-
approach-concussions (last visited Sept. 7, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/67H3-E5AA. 
67 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 3.2.4.17; Kevin Vaughan, Did NCAA Ignore 
Concussion Issue?, FOXSPORTS (June 6, 2014, 3:07 PM), http://msn.foxsports.com/ 
collegefootball/story/ncaa-concussion-lawsuit-mediation-harder-time-than-nfl-defending-
itself-110413, archived at http://perma.cc/U5KP-DMY9 (delivering that enforcement was 
still left discretion to the institutions).  See generally Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 42 
(illustrating the NCAA’s discussion of whether shall or should would be used and the 
implications it would have on the NCAA).  The Director of Health and Safety ultimately 
informed member institutions that “[a]ll of the shalls will be should’s.”  Id. at 42, 50.  
Generally, shall is mandatory and not directory.  Village of Mundelein v. Hartnett, 454 
N.E.2d 29, 33 (Ill. App. 2d 1983).  The  Plan further articulates that:   
The plan shall include, but is not limited to, the following: (Adopted:  
8/12/10) 
(a) An annual process that ensures student-athletes are educated about 
the signs and symptoms of concussions.  Student-athletes must 
acknowledge that they have received information about the signs and 
symptoms of concussions and that they have a responsibility to report 
concussion-related injuries and illnesses to a medical staff member; 
(b) A process that ensures a student-athlete who exhibits signs, 
symptoms or behaviors consistent with a concussion shall be removed 
from athletics activities (e.g., competition, practice, conditioning 
sessions) and evaluated by a medical staff member (e.g., sports 
medicine staff, team physician) with experience in the evaluation and 
management of concussions; 
(c) A policy that precludes a student-athlete diagnosed with a 
concussion from returning to athletics activity (e.g., competition, 
practice, conditioning sessions) for at least the remainder of that 
calendar day; and 
(d) A policy that requires medical clearance for a student-athlete 
diagnosed with a concussion to return to the athletics activity (e.g., 
competition, practice, conditioning sessions) as determined by a 
physician (e.g., team physician) or the physician’s designee. 
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17. 
68 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17 (demonstrating that all 
obligations are on the member institution).  See generally UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF 
ATHLETICS CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, UNIV. MIAMI (Aug. 1, 2014), available at 
http://hurricanesports.com/fls/28700/files/2014%20University%20of%20Miami%20CON
CUSSION%20POLICY.PDF, archived at http://perma.cc/6HQE-33B6 (exemplifying a 
member institution’s concussion management plan). 
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penalties imposed under the Constitution.69  However, member 
institutions often afford football programs greater protection because of 
their profitability; thus, universities will conceal violations that implicate 
its football program.70  To date, a member institution has never been 
charged with an infraction under the policy, despite blatant disregard.71 
                                                 
69 See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2, 63 (enumerating the penalties for 
noncompliance).  “A violation of Constitution 3.2.4.17 shall be considered an institutional 
violation per Constitution 2.8.1; however, the violation shall not affect the student-athlete’s 
eligibility.”  Id.  Although the document itself evidences enforcement, the NCAA has never 
actually effectuated any punishment.  Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24; see also NCAA 
DIV. I ADOPTED LEGIS. PROPOSAL NO. 2013-16, NCAA (Jan. 21, 2014), available at 
http://www.ncaa.org/sites/default/files/adopted_proposals_0114.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/CB2W-WDDB (dictating that a violation of 3.2.4.17 is considered a 
violation of failing to designate a team physician); DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 4 
(establishing the responsibility of the institution).  The manual states: 
Each institution shall comply with all applicable rules and regulations 
of the Association in the conduct of its intercollegiate athletics 
programs.  It shall monitor its programs to assure compliance and to 
identify and report to the Association instances in which compliance 
has not been achieved.  In any such instance, the institution shall 
cooperate fully with the Association and shall take appropriate 
corrective actions.  Members of an institution’s staff, student-athletes, 
and other individuals and groups representing the institution’s 
athletics interests shall comply with the applicable Association rules, 
and the Member Institution shall be responsible for such compliance. 
Id. 
70 See, e.g., Marsh & Robbins, supra note 55, at 668–69 (stating that “[w]hat campus 
leaders know is that although some people in another league or another part of the country 
may view college football as only a game, for many people affiliated with the institution, it 
is THE GAME”); see c.f. Stephanie Taylor Christensen, The Surprising Economics of College 
Football, MINYANVILLE (Nov. 11, 2011, 2:10 PM), http://www.minyanville.com/ 
businessmarkets/articles/college-football-economics-penn-state-football/11/11/2011/id/ 
37880, archived at http://perma.cc/8DRM-W2MM, (demonstrating that “there's a lot of 
money at stake in college football”); Alicia Jessup, The Economics of College Football:  A Look 
at the Top 25 Teams’ Revenues and Expenses, FORBES (Aug. 31, 2013, 10:32 AM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/aliciajessop/2013/08/31/the-economics-of-college-football 
-a-look-at-the-top-25-teams-revenues-and-expenses/, archived at http://perma.cc/9AGH-
U7B7 (providing the Department of Education’s data illustrating that college football 
programs often create the most revenue for an athletic department). 
71 See Brad Wolverton, Coach Makes the Call:  Athletic Trainers Who Butt Heads with Coaches 
over Concussion Treatment Take Career Hits, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Sept. 2, 2013), 
http://chronicle.com/article/Trainers-Butt-Heads-With/141333/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/DT6Z-YH6N (analyzing the stricter guidelines).  The NCAA added 
language to its Handbook advising that “[u]nder no circumstances should a student-athlete 
diagnosed with a concussion return to a sports activity the same day.”  Id.  However, the 
NCAA’s Chief Medical Officer, Brian Hainline, contended that the NCAA “can say, [t]his is 
how we believe medical care should be delivered . . . [but] can’t just shift and say, now 
everyone's going to do this.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Nathan Fenno, 
NCAA’s Concussion Culture Rooted in Denial, WASH. TIMES (July 22, 2013), 
http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/jul/22/ncaa-concussion-culture-rooted-
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Just one year after the 2010 amendments, Frostburg State fullback 
Derek Sheely died from head trauma he sustained on the field after 
being chastised by his coach to continue playing while concussed.72  
Following his death, Derek’s mother wrote a letter to NCAA president, 
Mark Emmert, requesting the NCAA’s support in her quest to prevent 
catastrophic head injuries.73  The NCAA’s Director of Health and Safety, 
Dr. David Klossner responded on behalf of Mr. Emmert, stating that 
“[p]art of the NCAA’s core mission is to provide student-athletes with a 
                                                                                                             
denial/?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/ZRJ5-MRUB [hereinafter NCAA’s Concussion 
Culture Rooted in Denial] (quoting the NCAA Director of Enforcement’s email to the NCAA 
President asserting it would be inappropriate to punish a coach for violating the 
concussion policy). 
72 Matt Crossman, Sharing Derek Sheely:  A Helmet-to-Helmet Hit Took the Life of a 22-Year-
Old Football Player:  Two Years Later, Friends and Family Keep His Memory Alive, One Story at a 
Time, SB NATION (Dec. 17, 2013) http://www.sbnation.com/longform/2013/12/17/ 
5217634/sharing-derek-sheely-a-helmet-to-helmet-hit-took-the-life-of-a-22, archived at 
http://perma.cc/AZE3-VDDL.  Derek Sheely was just twenty-two years old when he 
sustained a blow to the head that cost him his life.  Id.  He endured two straight days of 
rigorous contact before informing his coaches that he “didn’t feel right.”  Id.  Unfortunately, 
his plea for help was met with demands to toughen up and “[g]et back out there.”  
Complaint at 7–8, Kristen L. Sheely et al. v. NCAA, No. 380569-V (Montgomery Cnty. Ct. 
Md. Aug. 22, 2013) [hereinafter Sheely Complaint] (noting that the word concussion was 
not mentioned a single time in the Frostburg’s team policies).  Derek died from the brain 
injury he sustained during practice.  Id.; see also Barry Patchesky, Why Did Derek Sheely Die?, 
DEADSPIN (Nov. 13, 2013, 10:37 AM), http://deadspin.com/family-of-player-killed-in-
practice-sues-ncaa-coaches-1188048031/1463651387, archived at http://perma.cc/F8XA-
ZM6M (illustrating the pervasive failure).  “[J]ust about every authority failed [him], and 
neither the school nor the NCAA seem particularly keen on getting to the bottom of what 
happened.”  Id.  According to an anonymous letter sent to the Sheely’s after Derek’s death, 
the Frostburg coaches continued to yell at him even after he collapsed.  Sara Ganim, 
Unnecessary Roughness?  Players Question NCAA’s Record on Concussions, CNN (Oct. 30, 2014, 
9:00 AM), http://www.cnn.com/interactive/2014/10/us/ncaa-concussions/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/THU6-U999.  The complaint quotes: 
We must distinguish between pain and injury . . . In the rare event you 
are injured, remember the following: . . .  
5. If one cannot practice on Wednesday, he CANNOT START ON 
SATURDAY. 
6. If one cannot practice on a Thursday, he probably will not 
dress . . .   
8. Great champions can distinguish between pain and injury. 
Sheely Complaint, supra, at 13. 
73 Letter from Kristen Sheely, Exec. Dir., The Derek Sheely Fund., to Mark Emmert, 
President, NCAA (Dec. 30, 2011), available at http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/?p=1067, 
archived at http://perma.cc/39S2-WBAM; Nathan Fenno, Death of Frostburg State Player 
Derek Sheely Due to ‘Egregious Misconduct,’ Lawsuit Says, WASH. TIMES (Aug. 22, 2013), 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/aug/22/death-frostburg-state-
player-derek sheely-due-egre/#ixzz2iKGL1OeG, archived at http://perma.cc/AX6P-UXJW. 
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competitive environment that is safe and ensures fair play.”74  He 
assured her that the NCAA “will continue to devote [its] attention to 
health and safety issues and . . . enact change to its rules and standards 
when the medical evidence indicates it is appropriate to do so,” yet 
refused to investigate Derek’s death.75  Ironically, Dr. Klossner’s evasive 
response to Derek Sheely’s death directly contradicts his original intent 
for the NCAA’s Concussion Policy.76 
Initially, Dr. Klossner contended that the 2010 Concussion Plan 
would harshly punish coaches who knowingly returned a concussed 
athlete to play, but quickly retracted his statement and instead claimed 
infractions only be imposed in cases of systematic disregard.77  Yet, the 
NCAA admittedly did not have any oversight system in place to confirm 
that a member institution was following the Concussion Policy, nor did 
it enforce its requirement that each school have a concussion plan on 
file.78  According to the NCAA’s Director of Enforcement, Chris Strobel, 
“[t]he [concussion] legislation was specifically written to require 
institutions to have a plan and describe what minimum components had 
                                                 
74 Letter from David Klossner, NCAA Dir. of Health and Safety, to Kristen Sheely, Exec. 
Dir., The Derek Sheely Fund. (Mar. 20, 2012), available at http://nflconcussion 
litigation.com/?p=1067, archived at http://perma.cc/39S2-WBAM. 
75 Id. 
76 See Sheely Complaint, supra note 72, at 24–27 (showing Dr. Klossner’s crusade to 
implement strict rules).  Dr. Klossner was deterred from his initial ambition by fellow 
NCAA staff members’ fear of liability.  Id. at 26.  In an email thread, the Director of the 
Playing Rules Administration states, “Dave [Klossner] is hot/heavy on the concussion 
stuff.  He's been trying to force our rules committees to put in rules that are not good–I 
think I’ve finally convinced him to calm down.”  Id. 
77 Id. at 23–24.  In particular, Strobel initially stated “[p]enalties will depend on the 
circumstances of the violation . . . a coach [who] requires a student-athlete to compete after 
being informed [he] has been diagnosed with a concussion, [] would require a significant 
penalty.”  Id. at 23.  Yet, two hours later he claimed his emails were premature and was 
corrected that only “systematic or blatant disregard for the plan that would indicate a lack 
of institutional control” would most likely be considered a major violation.  Id.; Nathan 
Fenno, NCAA Continues to Prove it is Hypocritical to the Core, WASH. TIMES (Dec. 24, 2013), 
available at http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/dec/24/fenno-ncaa-continues-
prove-it-hypocritical-core/?page=all, archived at http://perma.cc/JJS2-MU3U [hereinafter 
Hypocritical to the Core] (illustrating the NCAA’s evasiveness with regard to player safety).  
“‘The NCAA denies that it has a legal duty to protect student-athletes,’ but admits that it 
was ‘founded to protect young people from the dangerous and exploitative athletic 
practices of the time.’”  Id. 
78 Hypocritical to the Core, supra note 77; see Eye On College Football Staff, Report:  NCAA 
Staffers Were Not on Board with Concussion Policy, CBS SPORTS (July 21, 2013, 12:59 PM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/eye-on-college-football/22837768/report-
ncaa-staffers-were-not-on-board-with-concussion-policy, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
CJH2-B5PU (stating an internal NCAA survey indicated that half of the member 
institutions “[did not] require a concussed athlete to see a doctor . . . [and o]nly sixty-six 
percent of schools used baseline testing”). 
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to be part of the plan—not about enforcing whether or not they were 
following their plan.”79  Ultimately, however, increased societal 
awareness of concussion dangers, unrelenting criticism of the NCAA, 
and a class action lawsuit forced the Association to finally implement 
additional procedures.80 
On September 12, 2011, former Eastern Illinois team captain, Adrian 
Arrington, filed a class action lawsuit against the NCAA for its 
mismanagement of concussions.81  The Plaintiffs alleged negligence, 
fraudulent concealment, medical monitoring, and unjust enrichment.82  
Shortly thereafter, several other former NCAA athletes began filing 
lawsuits against the NCAA for concussion mismanagement, which were 
                                                 
79 Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24. 
80 See Complaint, Arrington v. NCAA, No. 11CV06356 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 12, 2011) 
[hereinafter Arrington Complaint] (illustrating the motivation for the class action lawsuit); 
Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 33 (exposing internal NCAA emails addressing societal 
pressure); Jon Solomon, Who’s Suing the NCAA?  AL.com Database of Concussion Lawsuits by 
Ex-Players, AL.COM (Feb. 6, 2014, 5:00 AM), http://www.al.com/sports/index.ssf/2014/ 
02/whos_suing_the_ncaa_alcom_data.html, archived at http://perma.cc/Z44K-HPX5 
(conveying further information on the lawsuits failed against the NCAA).  The NCAA 
Managing Director of Government Relations, Abe Frank, cautioned his colleagues that 
“[t]he landscape has clearly changed around us, at the professional and high school levels, 
so the focus will remain on us as long as we do not have a rule that keeps a player out (at 
least same day) after a hit to the head.  It probably is not inconsistent to both have a base 
line rule regarding return to play and still keep most of the decisions at the local institution 
level.”  Arrington Memo, supra.  The Director of Health and Safety then asserted that he did 
not understand why it was necessary by replying, “[a]nd if not, what is the fall out.  I am 
not sure I have a grasp of not having a rule versus recommendations that favor 
institutional control.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  Correspondingly, the 
Associate Director of Government Relations replied:   
I assume we will continue to get negative press and likely continued 
Congressional scrutiny in the short run.  I do not expect the issue to go 
away soon as some baseline requirement . . . in this important area for 
the health and safety of our student-athletes is likely seen as a 
reasonable act to deter long term injury by many in the public. 
Id. at 34. 
81 Arrington Complaint, supra note 77; see Rachael Axon, Does NCAA Face More 
Concussion Liability Than NFL?, USA TODAY (July 25, 2013, 8:36 PM), available at 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/2013/07/25/ncaa-concussion-lawsuit-
adrian-arrington/2588189/, archived at http://perma.cc/6M6Z-JNCZ (narrating the story 
of Adrian Arrington, former college athlete and named plaintiff in the current class action 
suit against the NCAA who suffered a career-ending hit in 2009). See, e.g., Spencer 
Anderson, NCAA INSTITUTIONS AND A DUTY TO WARN FOOTBALL STUDENT-ATHLETES:  A 
LOOK INTO THE ARRINGTON V. NCAA CASE 5–6, available at 
http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/NCAA-Institutions-
and-a-Duty-to-Warn-copy1.pdf, (last visited Sept. 19, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/KUN5-L5JV (providing additional information on the lawsuit). 
82 Greg Ryan, Ex-NCAA Players Take Page From NFL Concussion Suit, LAW360 (Feb. 15, 
2013, 7:39 PM), http://www.law360.com/articles/416040/ex-ncaa-players-take-page-
from-nfl-concussion-suit, archived at http://perma.cc/YT9S-ZGBJ. 
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then consolidated with the Arrington lawsuit.83  On February 12, 2013, 
the Plaintiffs’ complaint was further amended to include express and 
implied contract claims based upon several well-established contract 
theories.84  During this time, both the NCAA and the student-athletes 
mutually sought a stay of the court’s consideration in order to pursue 
settlement discussions.85  The negotiations resulted in a proposed and 
largely criticized $75 million settlement, which was ultimately rejected 
by United States District Court Judge John Z. Lee.86 
During the same month as the proposed settlement, the NCAA 
released updated guidelines on concussion management similar to the 
agreed upon conditions of the settlement.87  Under the 
recommendations, the NCAA proposed limiting live contact during 
practice, ensuring that players receive medical care from independent 
experts whose sole interest is the athlete’s well-being, and that member 
institutions make their concussion plans available to the public.88  As 
part of the settlement agreement, the NCAA also implemented a 
reporting process for member institutions to report diagnosed 
concussions, which was eventually enacted as legislation in the Division 
I Manual.89 
On January 17, 2015, the NCAA updated its Division I Manual to 
include an additional section on Concussion Safety Protocol.90  The new 
protocol instituted a requirement that every institution annually submit 
its concussion guidelines to the Concussion Safety Protocol Committee.91  
                                                 
83 In Re NCAA Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litigation, No. 13 C 9116, at 3 (ND Ill. 
Dec. 17, 2014) [hereinafter Settlement Decision]. 
84 Second Amended Class Action Complaint, supra note 46, at 74–94. 
85 Settlement Decision, supra note 83, at 3. 
86 Ben Strauss, Judge Rejects $75 Million Settlement in Lawsuit Against N.C.A.A. on Head 
Injuries, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/18/ 
sports/judge-rejects-75-million-settlement-in-lawsuit-against-ncaa-on-head-injuries.html?_ 
r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/W4LA-GAMX.  Among his concerns, Judge Lee 
questioned the NCAA’s enforcement of penalties for member institutions that did not 
follow the stricter procedures.  Id. 
87 Concussion Guidelines, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety/concussion-
guidelines, (last visited Feb. 8, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/VT9A-RXUL; Jake New, 
Combating Concussions, INSIDE HIGHER ED (Oct. 2, 2014), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/10/02/u-michigans-response-athletes-
concussion-renews-regulation-debate, archived at https://perma.cc/CT9E-FUXT.  See e.g. 
Settlement Decision, supra note 83, at 5–8 (outlining the NCAA’s agreed upon terms). 
88 Doug Lederman, Playing Catch-up on Concussions, INSIDE HIGHER ED (July 8, 2014), 
https://www.insidehighered.com/news/2014/07/08/ncaa-publishes-guidelines-
concussions-and-player-safety, archived at https://perma.cc/3KNV-JG4J. 
89 Settlement Decision, supra note 83. 
90 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17.1. 
91 Id.  The revised protocol states: 
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The protocol further mandates that institutions provide all relevant 
information to the committee, upon its request, concerning any incident 
where a student-athlete sustained a concussion.92  Yet, the new protocol 
still omits enforcement procedures and instead relies on student-athletes 
to disclose concussion symptoms and member institutions to self-report 
violations, a nearly impossible task considering the neurological 
impairments involved in a concussion.93 
                                                                                                             
3.2.4.17.1 Concussion Safety Protocol.  [A] An institution shall submit 
its Concussion Safety Protocol to the Concussion Safety Protocol 
Committee by May 1 of each year.  The protocol shall be consistent 
with the Inter-Association Consensus:  Diagnosis and Management of 
Sport-Related Concussion Guidelines and shall include:  (Adopted:  
1/17/15)  
(a)  Policies and procedures that meet the requirements of Constitution 
3.2.4.17; 
(b)  Procedures for preparticipation baseline testing of each student-
athlete; 
(c)  Procedures for reducing exposure to head injuries; 
(d)  Procedures for education about concussion, including a policy that 
addresses return-to-learn; 
(e)  Procedures to ensure that proper and appropriate concussion 
management, consistent with best known practices and the Inter-
Association Consensus: Diagnosis and Management of Sport-Related 
Concussion Guidelines, is made available to any student-athlete who 
has suffered a concussion; 
(f)  Procedures requiring that the process of identifying, removing 
from game or practice, and assessing a student-athlete for a possible 
concussion are reviewed annually; and 
(g)  A written certificate of compliance signed by the institution’s 
athletics director. 
3.2.4.17.1.1 Information to Concussion Safety Protocol Committee.  [A] 
An institution shall provide information to the Concussion Safety 
Protocol Committee, as the committee may request, concerning any 
incident in which a student-athlete may have suffered a concussion.  
(Adopted:  1/17/15). 
Id. at arts. 3.2.4.17.1 & 3.2.4.17.1.1.  The Concussion Safety Protocol Committee is comprised 
of six individuals, including NCAA’s Chief Medical Officer, Brian Hainline and University 
of North Carolina Researcher, Kevin Guskiewicz.  Jon Solomon, Why the NCAA Won’t 
Adopt Concussion Penalties—At Least Not Yet, CBS SPORTS (Feb. 18, 2015, 4:58 PM), 
http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/25073014/why-the-ncaa-
wont-adopt-concussion-penalties----at-least-not-yet, archived at http://perma.cc/6G5J-
C7D4.  It was created by the Power Five conferences and will only oversee those 
conferences for the time being.  Id. 
92 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 3.2.4.17.1.1. 
93 See NCAA Guidelines on Head Injuries Fall Short, N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2014, at A16 
(criticizing the new guidelines).  “The NCAA is quite willing to enforce all manner of petty 
rules that have nothing to do with safety . . . [p]rotecting students should be a higher 
priority.”  Id.  The Executive Director of the Sports Legacy Institute, Chris Nowinski, feels 
the NCAA needs to reconsider its enforcement of concussion management, providing that 
it “is such an urgent problem that the national governing body needs to step up . . . [it] is a 
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B. A Neurological Nightmare 
Ohio State Defensive Lineman Kosta Karageorge is the most recent 
college athlete to fall victim to the concussion’s ruthless neurological 
havoc.94  Kosta, in his final cryptic message to his mother, indicated that 
concussions were the cause of his suicide.95  Yet, depression and suicidal 
tendencies are only two of the multitude of symptoms intrinsically 
linked to concussions.96  Recognition of all concussion symptoms is 
essential for proper diagnosis and treatment, which are crucial 
                                                                                                             
clear situation where athletes need to be protected, and [they are] not being protected.”  
Wolverton, supra note 71.  Nowinski believes the NCAA needs to expand oversight of 
member institutions and create harsher punishments to deter coaches from questioning 
medical decisions.  Id.  Further advancements have been made by the Big Ten Conference, 
which has enhanced its concussion protocols to include reporting requirements, 
disciplinary actions with non-compliance, and greater accountability for member 
institutions in the Big Ten.  Jon Solomon, Big Ten will Penalize for Not Complying with 
Concussion Standards, CBS NEWS (Dec. 8, 2014, 1:09 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/ 
collegefootball/writer/jon-solomon/24874744/big-ten-will-penalize-for-not-complying-
with-concussion-standards, archived at http://perma.cc/9Y35-TNT3.  Additionally, the Big 
Ten will employ an independent athletic trainer in the replay booth who can directly 
contact the officials on the field.  Id. 
94 Rick Maese, Concussions and Depression:  Questions Renewed Over Whether There’s a Link, 
WASH. POST (Dec. 6, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/sports/ 
concussions-and-depression-questions-renewed-over-whether-theres-a-link/2014/12/06/ 
1bbc8c3c-7c8e-11e4-8241-8cc0a3670239_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3PZZ-
WF9X; see also Lindsey Adler, “This Disease was Eating Away at his Brain,” BUZZFEED NEWS 
(Dec. 6, 2014, 1:35 PM), http://www.buzzfeed.com/lindseyadler/youth-football-brain-
disease-suicide#.sgwqYLMl5v, archived at http://perma.cc/TMB5-ULUT (linking Joseph 
Chernach’s suicide to CTE); Madison Park, College Football Player Who Committed Suicide 
Had Brain Injury, CNN (Sept. 14, 2010, 3:10 PM), http://www.cnn.com/ 
2010/HEALTH/09/14/thomas.football.brain/, archived at http://perma.cc/M762-6L8S 
(providing Owen Thomas’ story, who was diagnosed with CTE after his suicide). 
95 See Maese, supra note 94 (texting, “I am sorry if I am an embarrassment but these 
concussions have my head all [expletive] up.”). 
96 See Sara P. Chrisman & Laura P. Richardson, Prevalence of Diagnosed Depression in 
Adolescents with History of Concussion, 54 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 582, 584 (2014) (finding 
that teens who endure multiple concussions are three times more likely to suffer from 
depression than those who have never had a concussion); Tracey Covassin, David Stearne 
& Robert Elbin, Concussion History and Postconcussion Neurocognitive Performance and 
Symptoms in Collegiate Athletes, 43 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 119, 122–23 (2008) (elaborating on 
the chemical effects of a concussion).  “Recently, investigators have identified an emerging 
pattern of neurocognitive decrements commonly occurring . . . after a concussion [which] 
include visual-motor reaction time, memory, and attention.”  Id. at 123; Mary Elizabeth 
Dallas, Concussions Tied to Verbal Memory Loss in Young Athletes, HEALTHDAY (June 3, 2011), 
http://consumer.healthday.com/cognitive-and-neurological-health-information-26/brain-
health-news-80/concussions-tied-to-verbal-memory-loss-in-young-athletes-653570.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/4Y4V-H2S5 (identifying decreased brain function and 
cognitive processing among students who sustained a concussion). 
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determinants in preventing further senseless deaths.97  Unfortunately, 
concussion identification is particularly problematic because of the 
inherent complexity involved in head injury diagnosis.98  Yet, the current 
NCAA Concussion Policy delegates the near impossible task of 
recognizing a concussion to the student-athlete.99  The physiological 
trepidation an athlete endures during a head injury is understood by 
explaining the epidemiology of a concussion.100 
A concussion is a very enigmatic injury because it is practically 
impossible to diagnose with the naked eye.101  When making a diagnosis, 
medical personnel look for disturbances in the level of consciousness, 
                                                 
97 See Robert C. Cantu & Alissa D. Gean, Second-Impact Syndrome and a Small Subdural 
Hematoma:  An Uncommon Catastrophic Result of Repetitive Head Injury with a Characteristic 
Imaging Appearance, 27 J. NEUROTRAUMA 1557, 1557–58 (2010) (demonstrating the 
importance of proper diagnosis); Julian Bailes, Sports Concussion, NORTHSHORE UNIV. 
HEALTHSYSTEM (2014), http://www.northshore.org/orthopaedics/specialties/sports-
medicine/sports-concussion/, archived at http://perma.cc/3MCK-QB97 (stressing the 
critical importance of proper diagnosis so that athletes do not risk worsening symptoms or 
prolonged recovery). 
98 Zachary Y. Kerr et al., Disclosure and Non-Disclosure of Concussion and Concussion 
Symptoms in Athletes:  Review and Application of the Socio-ecological Framework, 28 BRAIN 
INJURY 1009, 1009–10 (2014); see Christine M. Baugh et al., Perceived Coach Support and 
Concussion Symptom-Reporting:  Differences Between Freshman and Non-Freshman College 
Football Players, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 314, 315 (2014) [hereinafter Perceived Coach Support] 
(conveying that “[s]ome studies have estimated that over 50% of concussions go 
undiagnosed, in large part due to athletes failing to report symptoms” (citations omitted)).  
Baugh also attributes undiagnosed concussions to lacking and unmandated coach 
education.  See id. at 320 (stating, “there appears to be variation in coaches’ abilities to 
recognize concussion . . . [a]lthough many state laws and sport league policies recommend 
coach concussion education, it is less frequently mandated”). 
99 See Barbara Osborne, Principles of Liability for Athletic Trainers:  Managing Sport-Related 
Concussion, 36 J. ATHLETIC TRAINING 316, 316 (2001) (emphasizing that recognizing and 
treating concussions is one of the most difficult problems facing even educated medical 
personnel).  See generally Therese A. West & Donald W. Marion, Current Recommendations 
for the Diagnosis and Treatment of Concussion in Sport:  A Comparison of Three New Guidelines, 
31 J. NEUROTRAUMA 159, 166 (Jan. 15, 2014) (reiterating the debate surrounding proper 
diagnosis and treatment of concussions). 
100 See infra Part II.B (discussing the concussion).  Epidemiology is defined as “the study 
of the occurrence and distribution of health-related states or events in specified 
populations, including the study of the determinants influencing such states, and the 
application of this knowledge to control the health problems.”  MIQUEL PORTA, A 
DICTIONARY OF EPIDEMIOLOGY 81 (2008). 
101 See Heather J. McCrea et al., Concussion in Sports, 5 SPORTS HEALTH 160–63 (2013) 
(explaining that concussion diagnosis is difficult because objective measurements are 
lacking); Daniel H. Daneshvar et al., The Epidemiology of Sport-Related Concussion, 30 
CLINICAL SPORTS MED. 1, 2 (2012) (stating that many concussions are not recognized by 
medical personnel and athletes); Paul McCrory et al., What is the Lowest Threshold to Make a 
Diagnosis of Concussion?, 47 B. J. SPORTS MED. 268–71 (2013) (conveying that concussion 
symptoms vary dramatically between athletes). 
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confusion, and amnesia.102  After a concussion, the brain’s ability to 
regulate, transmit, and send signals that control thought process is 
disrupted.103  As a result, decision-making, impulse control, and problem 
solving capabilities are significantly impaired.104  Moreover, the frenzied 
release of brain chemicals causes headaches, memory loss, anxiety, 
insomnia, and dizziness, which have been known to persist long after 
the initial impact.105  A head impact also causes intracranial pressure, 
thereby crushing brain tissue and cutting off the brain’s blood supply—a 
potentially catastrophic and deadly occurrence.106 
The effects of concussions are potentially devastating.107  Often, the 
occurrence of multiple concussions is most threatening to an athlete’s 
                                                 
102 Christopher S. Sahler & Brian D. Greenwald, Traumatic Brain Injury in Sports:  A 
Review, REHAB. RES. & PRAC. 1, 2 (2012).  See generally Cantu & Gean, supra note 97, at 1557–
58 (reaffirming the importance of using a computerized tomography scan (“CT scan”) to 
ensure that damage is not immediately life-threatening). 
103 Ivan Mulligan et al., Prevalence of Neurocognitive and Balance Deficits in Collegiate 
Football Players Without Clinically Diagnosed Concussion, 42 J. ORTHOPEDIC & SPORTS 
PHYSICAL THERAPY 625, 625–26 (2012); see Michelle Castillo, Contact Sports May Put Athletes 
at Higher Risk of Memory Loss Even Without Concussions, CBS NEWS (Dec. 12, 2013, 2:11 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/contact-sports-may-put-you-at-higher-risk-of-memory-
learning-loss-even-without-concussions/, archived at http://perma.cc/5ENA-XU68 
(finding that collegiate contact sport athletes are more likely to score lower on learning and 
memory tests at the end of the season). 
104 David B. Arciniegas et al., Mild Traumatic Brain Injury:  A Neuropsychiatric Approach to 
Diagnosis, Evaluation, and Treatment, 1 NEUROPSYCHIATRIC DISEASE & TREATMENT 311, 322–
23 (2005). 
105 Eric L. Legome & Rick Kulkarni, Postconcussive Syndrome, MEDSCAPE (May 13, 2013), 
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/828904-overview, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
Z2TD-9NEE; see RECOVERING FROM A CONCUSSION (HEAD INJURY); CORNELL UNIV., available 
at http://www.gannett.cornell.edu/cms/pdf/upload/Concussion.pdf, (last visited Sept. 
18, 2014), archived at http://perma.cc/UG47-LXHQ (warning that symptoms can last for 
days, weeks, and even months). 
106 Anne Trafton, Sensing When the Brain is Under Pressure, MIT NEWS OFFICE (Apr. 11, 
2012), http://web.mit.edu/newsoffice/2012/intracranial-pressure-monitor-0411.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/QPZ9-LQBJ; see T. Mori, Y. Katayama & T. Kawamata, Acute 
Hemispheric Swelling Associated with Thin Subdural Hematomas:  Pathophysiology of Repetitive 
Head Injury in Sports, 96 ACTA NEUROCHIRURGICA SUPP. 40, 41 (2006) (providing that second 
impact syndrome occurs because there is a lack of cerebral blood flow, which leads to 
blood vessel engorgement, increased intracranial pressure, and eventual herniation). 
107 See Jordan Gaines Lewis, From Sacks to Suicidality:  Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy 
and the NFL, SCITABLE (Nov. 21, 2013), http://www.nature.com/scitable/blog/mind-
read/from_sacks_to_suicidality_chronic, archived at http://perma.cc/XU56-DT2V 
(illustrating the suicidal tendencies accompanying CTE); Josh Levs, Steve Almasy & Joe 
Sutton, Paul Oliver’s Suicide is Latest in a String Among Former NFL Players, CNN (Sept. 26, 
2013, 4:14 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2013/09/25/us/former-nfl-player-suicide/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/4QSX-WUVY (conveying the suicides of several NFL athletes with 
CTE); Loy. Univ. Health Sys., Do Sports Concussions Really Cause Chronic Traumatic 
Encephalopathy?, SCIENCEDAILY (Dec. 2, 2013), http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/ 
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well-being.108  Second-impact syndrome is a lethal phenomenon that 
occurs when an athlete who sustains a head injury endures a second 
head injury before symptoms associated with the first have fully 
cleared.109  Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy (“CTE”) is a progressive 
disease also found in athletes with a history of repetitive brain trauma.110  
CTE can occur with even non-concussive hits to the head and can 
produce severe permanent consequences including paranoia, depression, 
dementia, aggression and suicidal tendencies.111  Alarmingly, NCAA 
football players are three times more likely to experience CTE-like 
                                                                                                             
2013/12/131202152036.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/4JFF-9YRM (demonstrating the 
severity of the long-term effects). 
108 See Jorge Castillo, College Athlete Died of Head Trauma, Father Says, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/08/31/sports/ncaafootball/college-football-
player-died-from-head-trauma-father-says.html, archived at http://perma.cc/JH2B-H3PJ 
(illustrating the detrimental effects of second-impact syndrome); Terry Zeigler, Second 
Impact Syndrome, SPORTSMD (2014), http://www.sportsmd.com/articles/id/38.aspx 
#sthash.FwEr2bIp.51kcX2uH.dpbs, archived at http://perma.cc/N8LX-RS8D (providing 
further information on the deadly second-impact syndrome); David X. Cifu & Craig C. 
Young, Repetitive Head Injury Syndrome, MEDSCAPE (Mar. 27, 2014), 
http://emedicine.medscape.com/article/92189-overview, archived at perma.cc/P7H3-
AFY8 (defining second-impact syndrome). 
109 Tareg Bey & Brian Ostick, Second Impact Syndrome, WEST J. EMERGENCY MED. (Feb. 10, 
2009), http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2672291/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/Y4VC-ATPF (providing that “[i]f, within several weeks [of sustaining a 
first head injury], the athlete returns to play and sustains a second head injury, diffuse 
cerebral swelling, brain herniation, and death can occur [and] young, healthy patients may 
die within a few minutes”); Barry Willer & John J. Leddy, Management of Concussion and 
Post-Concussion Syndrome, 8 CURRENT TREATMENT OPTIONS NEUROLOGY 415, 421 (2006) 
(cautioning that even those athletes without symptoms may be at risk for second-impact 
syndrome). 
110 See What is CTE:  Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy, SPORTS LEGACY INST., 
http://www.sportslegacy.org/research/cte/, archived at http://perma.cc/W6C6-55WU 
(2013) (elaborating that the multiple impacts trigger a progressive degeneration by 
stimulating the build-up of abnormal tau protein). 
111 Brandon E. Gavett, Robert A. Stern & Ann C. McKee, Chronic Traumatic 
Encephalopathy:  A Potential Late Effect of Sport-Related Concussive and Subconcussive Head 
Trauma, 30 CLINICS SPORTS MED. 179, 188 (2011); see Johna K. Register-Mihalik et al., 
Association Between Previous Concussion History and Symptom Endorsement During Preseason 
Baseline Testing in High School and Collegiate Athletes, 1 SPORTS HEALTH 61, 64 (2009) 
(cautioning that “college athletes with a history of multiple concussions may be at risk for 
experiencing concussion-linked symptoms well beyond the acute stage of injury”); Park, 
supra note 94 (stating that college athlete “[Owen] Thomas had never been diagnosed with 
a concussion as far back to the age of [nine,]” yet was still diagnosed with CTE). 
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symptoms than the general population.112  Unfortunately, little is known 
about the onset of CTE, thus absolute prevention is nearly impossible.113 
However, limiting exposure to head trauma is the most assured way 
to prevent any adverse effects.114  Nevertheless, it is common practice for 
an athlete to make the potentially fatal decision to ignore an injury, 
especially one as complex as a concussion.115  In recent years, several 
athletes have felt the insurmountable pressure to play through the pain 
and have lost their lives as a result.116  A college athlete’s decision to not 
disclose his concussion symptoms is largely influenced by several 
competing social factors.117 
                                                 
112 Expert Report of Bruce Deal Regarding the Medical Monitoring Fund at 12, In re Nat’l 
Collegiate Student-Athlete Concussion Injury Litig., No. 1:13-cv-09116 (N.D. Ill. July 28, 
2014).  It is also estimated that approximately 50–300 former college athletes will be 
diagnosed per year for those whose careers were from 1956 to 2008.  Id. at 13. 
113 See Ann C. McKee et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy in Athletes:  Progressive 
Tauopathy Following Repetitive Head Injury, 68 J. NEUROPATHOLOGY & EXPERIMENTAL 
NEUROLOGY 709, 710 (July 2009) (providing that the severity or recurrence of impact 
required to incite CTE remains unknown). 
114 See Christine M. Baugh et al., Chronic Traumatic Encephalopathy:  Neurodegeneration 
Following Repetitive Concussive and Subconcussive Brain Trauma, BRAIN IMAGING & BEHAV. 
(May 3, 2012), http://www.bu.edu/alzresearch/files/2013/02/Baugh-et-al-CTE-Review-
Brain-Imaging-and-Behavior-5-2012.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/F5NL-WMCB 
(describing the harm caused by repeated head trauma). 
115 See Marc Lillibridge, Injured or Hurt:  A Former Player’s Perspective on NFL Injuries, 
BLEACHER REP. (Aug. 20, 2012), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/1303698-injured-or-
hurt-a-former-players-perspective-on-nfl-injuries, archived at http://perma.cc/7L3X-GPD8 
(discussing the stigma surrounding admitting to an injury in the NFL); Wolverton, supra 
note 71 (providing that over fifty percent of collegiate athletic trainers have felt pressure to 
return an injured athlete to play faster than medically appropriate); Martin Roderick, Ivan 
Waddington & Graham Parker, Playing Hurt:  Managing Injuries in English Professional 
Football, 35 INT’L R. SOC. SPORT 165 (June 2000) (specifying that “the almost unrelenting 
pressure on players to continue playing through injury exacts a heavy cost in terms of pain, 
injury [and] long-term chronic disability”). 
116 See, e.g., Ryan Casey, Signs Weren't Obvious in Concussion Death of Jake Snakenberg, 
DENVER POST (Oct. 18, 2010, 4:16 PM), http://www.denverpost.com/ci_16358037, archived 
at http://perma.cc/8S2A-WXGB (conveying that Jake Snakenberg died from a “normal 
football hit” a week after sustaining a previous head injury); Andy Greder, Dassel-Cokato 
Football Player in Serious Shape After Head Injury, PIONEER PRESS (Sept. 9, 2013), 
http://athletictrainers.org/2013/09/09/dassel-cokato-football-player-in-serious-shape-
after-head-injury/, archived at http://perma.cc/8U6L-JTXW (stating that Luke Nelson was 
in serious condition after sustaining a hit in his second game of the season); Thomas 
Zambito, Montclair High School Trainer Faced Tough Questions in Football Player's 2008 Death, 
STAR LEDGER (Sept. 22, 2013, 8:54 PM), http://www.nj.com/essex/index.ssf/2013/ 
09/ryne_dougherty_lawsuit_montclair_high_school_trainer_faced_tough_questions_in_fo
otball_players_2008.html, archived at http://perma.cc/3BZL-SKXN (providing that Ryne 
Dougherty died twenty-five days after sustaining a hit during a football game). 
117 See infra Part II.C (providing further explanation of the socio-ecological factors that 
influence disclosure). 
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C. Cognitive Russian Roulette 
In the game of Russian roulette, competitors are individually 
responsible for evading a potentially deadly outcome.118  Participants 
often fail to comprehend the magnitude of their decision to partake in 
the activity, while outside influences entice continued engagement.119  It 
has been argued that a student-athlete faces a comparable impracticality 
under the NCAA Concussion Policy.120  The Policy requires self-
reporting of concussion symptoms, yet disclosure is inhibited by social 
implications.121  A myriad of socio-ecological factors are involved in the 
game of cognitive Russian roulette, hindering concussion reporting.122 
The Division I Manual specifies that “[s]tudent-athletes must 
acknowledge that they have received information about the signs and 
symptoms of concussions and that they have a responsibility to report 
concussion-related injuries and illnesses to a medical staff member.”123  
Some have voiced concern over the requirement, as it is believed that 
players and coaches are not in the best position to decide whether a 
                                                 
118 See Arnold v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 970 F.2d 360, 361 (7th Cir. 1992) (defining Russian 
roulette).  Russian roulette is “an act of bravado consisting of spinning the cylinder of a 
revolver loaded with one cartridge, pointing the muzzle at one's own head, and pulling the 
trigger.”  Id. 
119 See Wickman v. Nw. Nat. Ins. Co., 908 F.2d 1077, 1087 (1st Cir. 1990) (reporting that 
individuals regularly participate in Russian roulette neither expecting nor intending to be 
killed); People v. Hansen, 59 Cal. App. 4th 473, 476–78 (1997) (demonstrating the external 
pressures on initiating and participating in a game of Russian roulette). 
120 See Associated Press, NCAA Settles Head-Injury Lawsuit, Will Changes Rules for Players, 
CBS NEWS (July 29, 2014, 10:20 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/ncaa-settles-head-
injury-lawsuit-will-changes-rules-for-players/, archived at http://perma.cc/K2YA-RKSA 
(criticizing the NCAA’s self-reporting system for concussions). 
121 See infra Part II.C (exploring the social factors that hinder reporting); Kerr, supra note 
98, at 1009–10 (elaborating on the socio-ecological factors involved in intercollegiate 
football); Kevin Young et al., Body Talk:  Male Athletes Reflect on Sport, Injury and Pain, 11 
SOC’Y SPORT J. 175, 175–76 (1994) [hereinafter Body Talk] (demonstrating further reasons for 
why athletes remain in play); Agnew v. NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2012) (giving a 
financial incentive to remain in play while symptomatic). 
122 See infra Part II.C (illuminating the social ramifications involved in intercollegiate 
football). 
123 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11; MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64; see 
Anthony S. McCaskey & Kenneth W. Biedzynski, A Guide to the Legal Liability of Coaches for 
a Sports Participant's Injuries, 6 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 7, 33 (1996) (expressing the difficulty 
of keeping an injured athlete from competing); see also LSU, LSU ATHLETICS 2013–2014, at 
32 (2013), available at http://compliance.lsu.edu/studentathletes/Documents/handbook% 
20201314.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/9X2Z-6NJ4 (reaffirming a college’s issuance of 
responsibility to the athlete).  “While we recognize that the medical staff plays an 
important role in the identification of concussions, the student-athlete is equally 
responsible for notifying the athletic training staff if they believe they may have suffered a 
concussion.”  Id. 
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concussed athlete should return to the game.124  On an intrapersonal 
level, a student-athlete may choose not to disclose concussion symptoms 
either due to lack of awareness or internal pressures.125  In compliance 
with the NCAA’s stipulation, nearly 90% of universities require an 
athlete acknowledge his role in reporting a concussion.126  However, only 
71% actually provide athletes with concussion education materials.127  
Thus, athletes often fail to report concussion symptoms out of sheer 
ignorance.128  In fact, a 2002 study of college athletes indicated that only 
20% of those who experienced a concussion actually recognized they had 
sustained the injury.129  Shortcomings in the NCAA Concussion Policy 
have been criticized as playing a role in this oblivion.130 
                                                 
124 See NCAA Sport Science Institute, Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play:  Student-
Athlete Subjectivity, NCAA (Sept. 12, 2013), http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-
safety/medical-conditions/concussion-symptoms-and-return-play-student-athlete, archived 
at http://perma.cc/MLY9-ZAFP [hereinafter Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play] 
(providing data as to the amount of athletes who report concussions).  “[Forty-three] 
percent of student athletes with a history of concussion reported that they had knowingly 
hidden symptoms of a concussion to stay in a game; [twenty-two] percent indicated that 
they would be unlikely or very unlikely to report concussion symptoms to a coach or 
athletic trainer in the future.”  Id.  The study also found that “[m]ale athletes and athletes 
with a prior history of concussion were more likely to indicate that they would not report 
future concussion symptoms, despite acknowledging they had received formal education 
in concussion.”  Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Christine M. Baugh et al., Concussion Management in United States College Sports:  
Compliance with National Collegiate Athletic Association Concussion Policy and Areas for 
Improvement, 43 AM. J. SPORTS MED. 47, 54 (2014) [hereinafter Concussion Management]; see 
DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11 (quoting language that requires implementation of 
both steps).  See, e.g., UNIV. UTAH SCH. MED., SPORTS CONCUSSION MANAGEMENT PLAN 8 
(2011), available at https://healthcare.utah.edu/orthopaedics/concussion-management-
plan.pdf, archived at https://perma.cc/DJY4-X9UG (exemplifying a member institution’s 
concussion management plan).  Under the plan, a student-athlete must acknowledge that it 
is his responsibility to report any concussion symptoms.  Id. 
127 Concussion Management, supra note 126, at 54. 
128 Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015.  Athletes often remain in play while concussed because 
they believe their head injury is not serious enough to report.  Id.  In one study of high 
school athletes, only thirteen percent of “bell-ringer” type hits were reported because the 
athlete perceived the injury to be insignificant, even though they are still capable of 
producing concussive symptoms.  Id.  Approximately ninety percent of sport-related 
concussions are considered mild and characterized by subtle symptoms.  Gordon A. Bloom 
et al., The Prevalence and Recovery of Concussed Male and Female Collegiate Athletes, 8 EUR. J. 
SPORT SCI. 295, 296 (2008) (citing J. Scott Delaney et al., Concussions Among University 
Football and Soccer Players, 12 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 331 (2002)).  Nevertheless, athletes 
were better able to recognize they had sustained a concussion after being educated on the 
issue.  See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015 (providing multiple findings that concussion 
education slightly improved reporting). 
129 Bloom et al., supra note 128, at 296.  The majority of athletes continued to play while 
symptomatic because they were not aware that the symptoms were indicative of a 
concussion.  Id.; see Emily Kroshus et al., NCAA Concussion Education in Ice Hockey:  An 
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The NCAA Division I Manual provides little guidance on substance 
or delivery of the educational materials.131  In addressing this issue, the 
NCAA conceded that “concussion education needs to be improved and 
evaluated [to] better ensure that we are having an impact on 
behavior . . . the NCAA Sport Science Institute hopes that we will 
achieve this necessary cultural shift through a more robust and evidence-
driven educational paradigm.”132  Nevertheless, even with proper 
concussion education, some athletes still knowingly conceal their 
symptoms.133  This blatant disregard is often a result of self-imposed 
demands.134 
An athlete’s internal pressure can cause him to set high, occasionally 
unrealistic, expectations.135  As a result, athletes overexert their body in 
order to optimize performance.136  Accordingly, their tenacity can 
                                                                                                             
Ineffective Mandate, 48 BRITISH J. SPORTS MED. 135, 138–40 (2014) (concluding that the 
NCAA’s current education system is ineffective).  The Handbook offers limited guidelines 
on concussion education:  “[S]tudent-athletes must sign a statement in which they accept 
the responsibility for reporting their injuries and illnesses to the institutional medical staff, 
including signs and symptoms of concussions.  During the review and signing process, 
student-athletes should be presented with educational material on concussions.”  MEDICINE 
HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64. 
130 Concussion Management, supra note 126, at 54 (citing Emily Kroshus et al., NCAA 
Concussion Education in Ice Hockey:  An Ineffective Mandate, 48 BRITISH J. SPORTS MED. 135, 
138–40 (2014)). 
131 Concussion Management, supra note 126, at 54; see also MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 
56, at 64 (articulating that “[d]uring the review and signing process, student-athletes 
should be presented with educational material on concussions”). 
132 Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 124. 
133 Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015; Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 124.  
College football players are significantly more likely to conceal a concussion than other 
surveyed athletes.  Kerr, supra.  The football players indicated that, after being hit in the 
head, 61% still played with concussive symptoms in a championship game, compared to 
30% of other college athletes.  Id. 
134 Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015. 
Current findings suggest that athletes may be reluctant to disclose 
concussions if it results in removal from sports participation.  Because 
athletes may believe reporting concussions is stigmatizing, it is 
essential that sports organizations utilize interventions to, first, 
educate athletes on how to recognize concussion symptoms and, 
second, emphasize the long-term health benefits of reporting 
concussions as well as the risks of playing while concussed. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
135 Melinda Halpern, Managing Internal and External Pressures, GRIT PERFORMANCE (Feb. 
14, 2013), http://gritperformance.com/blog/2013/2/14/managing-internal-and-external-
pressures, archived at http://perma.cc/LDZ8-QH73. 
136 Kerr, supra note 98, at 1018 (citing Declan Connaughton, et al., The Development and 
Maintenance of Mental Toughness:  Perceptions of Elite Performers, 26 J. SPORTS SCIS. 83 (2008)). 
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influence how they respond to an injury.137  An athlete’s devotion to 
success and perfection, coupled with a fear of failure and shame, may 
cause him to ignore critical symptoms.138  Athletes are also motivated by 
their desire to advance to the next level, where admitting pain suggests 
weakness and tarnishes the player’s reputation.139 
Injured athletes are frequently stigmatized; thus, an injury has been 
known to greatly hinder the possibility of playing in the NFL.140  
Recently, the NFL draft has seen a large influx of younger college 
athletes.141  Student-athletes often enter the draft early to preempt any 
injury that could jeopardize a possible professional career.142  It is a level 
achieved by few athletes, yet most continue to compromise their mental 
and physical health in an attempt to realize their aspirations.143  
                                                 
137 Declan Connaughton, et al., The Development and Maintenance of Mental Toughness:  
Perceptions of Elite Performers, 26 J. SPORTS SCIS. 89 (2008).  Connaughton and colleagues 
reasoned, “having an insatiable desire and internalized motives to succeed . . . was [] 
assumed to influence [responses] to sport-related injuries.”  Id. 
138 Kerr, supra note 98, at 1018 (citing Sam S. Sagar & Joachim Stoeber, Perfectionism, Fear 
of Failure, and Affective Responses to Success and Failure:  The Central Role of Fear of Experiencing 
Shame and Embarrassment, 31 J. SPORT & EXERCISE PSYCHOL. 602, 602–27 (2009)). 
139 See Anand Veeravagu, What’s Really Killing Athletes with Concussions?, DAILY BEAST 
(Dec. 26, 2013), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2013/12/26/what-s-killing-
concussed-players-who-left-the-nfl.html, archived at http://perma.cc/EPK4-5GV5 
(contextualizing the pressures associated with hiding an injury).  Dr. Veeravagu provides 
that:   
In today’s era of athletic competition where money, fame, and whole 
industries are on the line, admitting pain or discomfort suggests 
weakness and can have severe consequences for the player and the 
team.  Thus, players often rack up multiple concussions throughout 
their career.  Data suggests that head injuries are significantly 
underreported by players, who often dismiss concussive symptoms.  
These are all direct contributors to a robust concussion culture in 
contact. 
Id. 
140 Lillibridge, supra note 115. 
141 Kevin Clark, NFL Draft:  College Football’s NFL Problem:  Why are Underclassmen 
Suddenly Leaving in Droves for the NFL Draft?, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 2, 2014, 10:24 PM), 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702304585004579415241023161788?m
g=reno64-wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB1000142405270230458 
5004579415241023161788.html, archived at http://perma.cc/BYK7-4BA8 (cautioning that 
younger athletes are given incentives to enter the NFL draft as early as sophomore year). 
142 Jason Clary, College vs. Pros:  Should Athletes Leave School Early?, BLEACHER REP. (Dec. 
13, 2009), http://bleacherreport.com/articles/307746-college-vs-pros-should-athletes-be-
allowed-to-leave-school-early, archived at http://perma.cc/8YDT-XWEF. 
143 See Megan McArdle, Head Injuries Make Football a Bad Bet, BLOOMBERG VIEW (Nov. 13, 
2013, 11:22 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2013-11-13/head-injuries-
make-football-a-bad-bet, archived at http://perma.cc/X5HF-G3VK (cautioning that dozens 
of athletes risk their health for one spot in the NFL); see also LYDIA BELL ET AL., SELF-
REPORTED CONCUSSION AMONG NCAA STUDENT-ATHLETES:  EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Feb. 
2014), available at http://ncaa.org/sites/default/files/Concussion%20%20GOALS%20Exec 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 3 [2015], Art. 16
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss3/16
2015]    Deception, Degeneration, and the Delegation of Duty 1071 
Unfortunately, outside inducements may further encourage this 
behavior.144 
Non-disclosure can result from environmental influences, which 
include cultural implications and interpersonal relationships.145  
Understandably, financial retention can induce a scholarship athlete to 
conceal concussive symptoms, which may be revoked if he is unable to 
play the year following an injury.146  Upon choosing a college, the 
                                                                                                             
%20Summary_Feb_12_2014_FINALpost.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/N246-FLQY 
(concluding that year in school and first-team status directly correlate with concussion 
reporting); Michael McCrea et al., Unreported Concussion in High School Football Players:  
Implications For Prevention, 14 CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 13, 15 (2004) (finding that motivation 
not to be withheld from competition made up forty-one percent of unreported concussions 
among varsity football players and disregard for seriousness made up sixty-six percent of 
unreported concussions); Doug Brown, “Dangerously Excessive”:  How Washington State 
Football Confronted, and Didn’t Confront the First Bad News of the Mike Leach Era, DEADSPIN 
(Jan. 8, 2013, 1:15 PM), http://deadspin.com/5974159/dangerously-excessive-how-
washington-state-football-confronted-and-didnt-confront-the-first-bad-news-of-the-mike-
leach-era, archived at http://perma.cc/U8UX-ZG4F (illuminating incentives placed on 
athletes to conceal an injury). 
144 See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1016 (stating, “studies support that an athlete’s decision to 
disclose, as well as their general concussion knowledge, is influenced by other individuals 
within a sports organization”). 
145 Id. 
146 Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, NCAA, http://www.ncaa.org/about/ 
frequently-asked-questions-about-ncaa, archived at http://perma.cc/SMF8-ASTM (Jan. 24, 
2014); see Wolverton, supra note 71 (providing that recent studies have shown that athletes 
are underreporting concussions because they do not want to risk having their scholarships 
revoked); Jon Solomon, Plaintiffs Want Judge Removed in John Rock v. NCAA Scholarship Case, 
CBS SPORTS (Dec. 12, 2014, 1:34 PM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/ 
writer/jon-solomon/24882488/plaintiffs-want-judge-removed-in-john-rock-v-ncaa-
scholarship-case, archived at http://perma.cc/LU8K-WPBE [hereinafter Plaintiffs Want 
Judge Removed] (relaying further information on the one-year scholarship rule and the push 
to eliminate it).  See generally RAMOGI HUMA & ELLEN J. STAUROWSKI, NAT’L COLLEGE 
PLAYERS ASS’N, THE PRICE OF POVERTY IN BIG TIME COLLEGE SPORTS 20 (2011), available at 
http://assets.usw.org/ncpa/The-Price-of-Poverty-in-Big-Time-College-Sport.pdf, archived 
at http://perma.cc/Q2XP-EMA7 (demonstrating the necessity of scholarship money by 
providing that “[t]hrough the NCAA, college presidents mandate impoverished conditions 
for young, valuable players and throw money around to all other college sports 
stakeholders when those players perform well, a formula that drives the powerful black 
market that thrives at so many universities nationwide”).  Since 2002, universities have had 
the option to provide multi-year scholarships, though many still keep the agreements to 
one year.  Plaintiffs Want Judge Removed, supra.  The NCAA reiterates that:   
Depending on various circumstances, a school can choose not to renew 
or cancel a student-athlete’s scholarship[].  The school has the choice to 
reduce or cancel the scholarship at the end of the period of the award.  
The school could also cancel the scholarship during the period of the 
award under the following circumstances:  [1] Student-athlete becomes 
ineligible, [2] Student-athlete commits fraud, [3] Misconduct, [4] Quits 
the team for personal reasons. 
Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, supra. 
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student-athlete signs the National Letter of Intent (“NLI”), which binds 
him to the institution.147  Although the athlete is unable to retract his 
commitment to the athletic program, member institutions can arbitrarily 
revoke a previously made promise of financial aid under the contract.148  
Likewise, the Division I Manual allows member institutions to penalize a 
student athlete if he “[v]oluntarily withdraws from a sport at any time 
for personal reasons” by reducing or cancelling his financial aid.149 
Additionally, masculine perception and associating concussion 
reporting with weakness can influence an athlete.150  The notion that 
                                                 
147 See Michael J. Cozzillio, The Athletic Scholarship and the College National Letter of Intent:  
A Contract by Any Other Name, 35 WAYNE L. REV. 1275, 1300 (1989) (stating that “the Letter 
of Intent . . . has served as a partial predicate for judicial recognition of the contractual 
relationship between university and student”).  See generally National Letter of Intent (NLI), 
NAT’L LETTER INTENT (2014), http://www.nationalletter.org/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/4HM5-8E8L (providing background on the NLI); see c.f. Debra D. Burke & 
Angela J. Grube, The NCAA Letter of Intent:  A Voidable Agreement for Minors?, 81 MISS. L.J. 
265, 275 n.60 (2011) (demonstrating legal obligations imposed under the NLI); Agnew v. 
NCAA, 683 F.3d 328, 332 (7th Cir. 2012) (illustrating two accounts of scholarship athletes 
who lost their financial aid after sustaining an injury); Sean Hanlon & Ray Yasser, "J.J. 
Morrison" and His Right of Publicity Lawsuit Against the NCAA, 15 VILL. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 
241, 283 (2008) (identifying the NLI as a form contract). 
148 See Stephen F. Ross & Lindsay Berkstresser, Using Contract Law to Tackle the Coaching 
Carousel, 47 U.S.F.L. REV. 709, 713–14, 726–27 (2013) (establishing inconsistency with NLI 
enforcement).  C.f. Sean M. Hanlon, Student Article, Athletic Scholarships As Unconscionable 
Contracts of Adhesion:  Has the NCAA Fouled Out?, 13 SPORTS L. J. 41, 71–72 (2006) (arguing 
the National Letter of Intent is unconscionable); Johnson v. Mobil Oil Corp., 415 F. Supp. 
264, 268 (1976) (finding that unconscionability is determined by considering whether a 
“real and voluntary meeting of the minds” is evidenced). 
149 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 15.3.4.2(d); see Ben Strauss, A Fight to Keep 
College Athletes from the Pain of Injury Costs, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/25/sports/a-fight-to-keep-college-athletes-from-the-
pain-of-injury-costs.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/P2MR-RAZM (narrating 
several circumstances where athletes lost their scholarship due to an injury); see, e.g., 
STUDENT-ATHLETES:  FINANCIAL AID, LOUISIANA STATE UNIV. 502D: 5 (Nov. 2006), available 
at http://www.lsusports.net/src/data/lsu/assets/docs/ad/policymanual/pdf/502D.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/V6W3-NMYC [hereinafter LSU STUDENT ATHLETES] (providing 
that “the renewal of aid may be denied if the student-athlete: . . . [v]oluntarily withdraws 
from participation in a sport for personal reasons”); Jackson v. Drake Univ., 778 F. Supp. 
1490, 1493 (S.D. Iowa 1991) (construing all financial aid agreements as valid contracts); 
Hysaw v. Washburn Univ. of Topeka, 690 F. Supp. 940, 946–47 (D. Kan. 1987) (defining 
documents signed by a prospect as “written scholarship contracts”). 
150 Sara P. Chrisman et al., Qualitative Study of Barriers to Concussive Symptom Reporting in 
High School Athletics, 52 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 330, 333 (2013) [hereinafter Qualitative 
Study of Barriers]; Rob Hughes, Time to Remove Coaches from Concussion Decisions, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 5, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/06/sports/soccer/time-to-remove-
coaches-from-concussion-decisions.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/EY9N-V2SS 
(specifying that society applauds risky behaviors in football).  According to Hughes, 
coaches and athletes are driven by adrenaline and are certainly not qualified in such 
medical matters.  Id.  Chrisman contributes that “[a]thletes [] described times when they 
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“‘real’ men play sport[s] in an intensely confrontational manner” is 
engrained in contact sport athletes.151  In furthering this ideal, athletes 
are often encouraged to suppress an injury.152  This behavior is 
recognized as being considerably perpetrated by the coach.153  Coaches 
that support injury reporting are crucial for facilitating increased team 
concussion safety; an ideal that is articulated in the Division I Manual.154 
The NCAA Division I Manual maintains that “[i]t is the 
responsibility of each member institution to protect the health of, and 
provide a safe environment for, each of its participating student-
athletes.”155  Unfortunately, large salaries and sizeable performance-
based bonuses incentivize most coaches.156  Further, profitability of the 
athletic program and job retention can inflict undue pressure on the 
coach to win, occasionally at the expense of the athlete.157  As one study 
                                                                                                             
thought they were concussed, but didn’t report symptoms.  They felt it was not acceptable 
to leave the game . . . because it made them look weak.”  Qualitative Study of Barriers, supra. 
151 Body Talk, supra note 121, at 175–76 (emphasis added). 
152 Sheely Complaint, supra note 72, at 7–8; Body Talk, supra note 121, at 175–76. 
153 See Jesse A. Steinfeldt et al., Masculinity Socialization in Sports:  Influence of College 
Football Coaches, 12 PSYCHOL. MEN & MASCULINITY 247, 257 (2011) (stressing the influence 
coaches have on athletes); Brian Burnsed, NCAA Mental Health Task Force Holds First 
Meeting, NCAA (Nov. 26, 2013, 12:00 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media 
-center/news/ncaa-mental-health-task-force-holds-first-meeting, archived at http://perma. 
cc/3F63-JVSS (admitting the influence that coaches have over an athlete’s mental health). 
154 Perceived Coach Support, supra note 98, at 320; DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 
2.2.3. 
155 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at art. 2.2.3; see also Chris Fuhrmeister, ‘The NCAA 
Denies That it Has Legal Duty to Protect Student Athletes’, SB NATION (Dec. 19, 2013, 11:09 
AM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/12/19/5227480/ncaa-concussion-
lawsuits-derek-sheely, archived at http://perma.cc/5L2N-ESF7 (providing the NCAA’s 
position that player safety is the responsibility of member institutions).  The NCAA agrees 
that safety is an issue, but contends that it cannot be held liable for individual injuries.  Id.  
The NCAA further asserts that it “attempts to educate schools on how to properly keep 
their players safe, but it's up to said schools to actually implement the proper precautions 
and create a safe environment.”  Id.  But see MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2 
(stating that student-athletes rightfully assume that it is the shared responsibility of all who 
sponsor intercollegiate athletics to minimize the inherent risks of the sport). 
156 Perceived Coach Support, supra note 98, at 315 (citing Steve Berkowitz et al, NCAA 
Salaries, USA TODAY, http://sports.usatoday.com/ncaa/salaries (last visited Jan. 24, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/NB22-LP76); see also Jim Baumbach, Special Report:  College 
Football Coaches Salaries’ and Perks are Soaring, NEWSDAY (Oct. 4, 2014, 6:25 PM), 
http://www.newsday.com/sports/college/college-football/fbs-college-football-coaches-
salaries-are-perks-are-soaring-newsday-special-report-1.9461669, archived at http://perma. 
cc/J6Q3-FSMH (providing insight on coach incentives, including five-figure bonuses with 
a bowl appearance or a requisite amount of regular season wins). 
157 Mark Koba, College Football:  Why Pressure to Win is So Big, CNBC (Dec. 1, 2012, 3:48 
AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/50025280#, archived at http://perma.cc/EA6F-DK6Z.  
“Coaches are going to be gone much sooner than in the past if they don’t win and they’ll be 
under so much pressure to recruit the best players, and the players will have to perform 
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indicated, athletes admitted to receiving negative feedback from their 
coach for reporting an injury.158  Others were blamed for the team’s 
loss.159  However, beyond actual reprimands, an athlete’s perceived fear 
of repercussions from the coach can, itself, deter disclosure of concussion 
symptoms.160  Likewise, injury concealment is also effectuated through 
the coach’s dominance over the team’s medical personnel.161 
Under the Medicine Handbook, an institution is to employ a health 
care provider to ensure the safety and well-being of student-athletes.162  
It also specifies that a coach must not have a “primary hiring or firing 
role” in the medical staff’s employment.163  However, a recent survey of 
college athletic trainers found that nearly one-third of respondents 
indicated the football coaching staff had influence over their 
employment.164  As a result, trainers are admittedly pressured to 
prematurely allow student-athletes to return to play faster than 
medically appropriate.165  Similar to the athlete, an athletic trainer’s 
                                                                                                             
well . . . [t]he competition is going to be fierce.”  Id.; see also McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra 
note 123, at 12 n.9 (conveying that “[b]ecause of such tort doctrines as respondeat superior, 
vicarious liability, and sovereign immunity, a coach’s tortious conduct may result in 
liability against the coach’s employer”). 
158 Kerr, supra note 98, at 1016 (citing Qualitative Study of Barriers, supra note 147, at 330–
35). 
159 Id. 
160 Kerr, supra note 98, at 1017.  “An often-mentioned fear of injured athletes is that they 
will be ‘brushed aside’, and the loss of attention from coaches enhances the negative 
consequences of injury.”  R. Malinauskas, College Athletes’ Perceptions of Social Support 
Provided by their Coach Before Injury and After it, 48 J. SPORTS MED. & PHYSICAL FITNESS 107, 
111 (2008).  Data indicates “coaches have more influence than any other factor over 
whether student-athletes view their college experience as positive or negative.”  Burnsed, 
supra note 153. 
161 Justin Rigby et al., Understanding Athletic Trainers’ Belief Toward a Multifaceted Sport-
Related Concussion Approach:  Application of the Theory of Planned Behavior, 48 J. ATHLETIC 
TRAINING 636, 640 (2013); see Wolverton, supra note 71 (illustrating the control coaches have 
over medical personnel).  Before the 1990’s, medical personnel often survived multiple 
coaching changes, but increasing profits have allotted coaches more discretion in choosing 
their staff, which for many includes medical personnel.  Wolverton, supra; see also Brown, 
supra note 143 (illustrating confrontation between trainers and coaches). 
162 MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 8. 
163 Id. 
164 Wolverton, supra note 71. 
165 Id.  Of the fifty-three who confided that they felt pressure to return a player faster than 
medically necessary, forty-two stated that they felt pressure from the coach even when the 
injury was a concussion.  Id.; see Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 36 (providing the 
University of Georgia’s assistant athletic trainer’s observations and expressed concerns 
with neglected return to play guidelines).  The trainer states that “we all know that there 
are times where athletes are returned to games with concussions . . . I personally have seen 
an athlete knocked unconscious and return in the same quarter in recent years.”  Id. 
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perception of the coach can also influence return to play decisions.166  
Restructuring the current hierarchy to allow medical personnel to report 
directly to the health department may cure this conflict.167  Promisingly, 
some programs are implementing this hypothesized model with 
significant success.168  However, most continue to be plagued by injury 
concealment and concussion underreporting as a result of the NCAA 
Concussion Policy’s deficiencies.169 
Just one year after Jordan Matthews’ tribulation, University of 
Michigan quarterback Shane Morris endured a direct hit to his head in 
the season opener against the University of Minnesota.170  Following the 
blow, Shane unsteadily rose to his feet, stumbled, and was caught by 
offensive lineman Ben Braden.171  Although he struggled to raise his 
head, Shane signaled to the sideline that he did not need a 
                                                 
166 See generally Rigby et al., supra note 161, at 640 (attributing underreported concussions 
to the medical personnel’s believed absence of authority).  Under the current system, 
athletic trainers “feel they lack complete authority to implement the recommended 
guidelines.”  Id. at 640. 
167 Id. at 641.  The idea is that medical personnel will benefit from being surrounded with 
a support system of individuals who better understand concussions, rather than reporting 
to athletic directors who likely have more of a coaches’ mentality.  Id.; see Big 12 Announces 
Concussion Diagnosis and Management Policy, XII (Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.big12 
sports.com/ViewArticle.dbml?DB_OEM_ID=10410&ATCLID=209895746, archived at 
http://perma.cc/V3WE-KYBA (providing the Big 12 Conferences new concussion 
protocol).  The Big 12 Conferences’ protocol emphasizes that coaches will not have any 
influence on the unchallengeable decisions of the medical personnel.  Id. 
168 See generally Darrin Scheid, Room for Change, NAT’L ATHLETIC TRAINING ASS’N 10–14 
(Mar. 2011), available at http://www.nata.org/sites/default/files/Collegiate-Healthcare-
Model-Article.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/2NG2-FULW (conveying the benefits of 
moving athletic trainers from the athletic department to campus health services).  Renard 
Sacco, Coordinator of Sports Medicine at Kutztown University explains:   
Athletic trainers, by and large, haven’t had somebody in the athletic 
department to champion their cause . . . [a] big percentage of athletic 
directors, are former coaches who don’t have the same view or 
approach to athletic medicine as the athletic trainer or other medical 
professionals.  That actually hurts athletic trainers moving forward, 
especially if they’re trying to get their work environment better 
organized and more efficiently run. 
Id. at 11. 
169 See Jon Solomon, Congressman Urges NCAA to Have Concussion Penalties, CBS SPORTS 
(Nov. 12, 2014, 3:13 PM), available at http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/ 
jon-solomon/24801901/congressman-urges-ncaa-to-have-concussion-penalties, archived at 
http://perma.cc/8XSE-9VVP (critiquing the NCAA’s shortcomings). 
170 Drew Hallett, The Fireable Offense of Brady Hoke, SB NATION (Sept. 28, 2014, 9:07 AM), 
http://www.maizenbrew.com/2014/9/28/6855989/2014-michigan-wolverines-football-
fire-brady-hoke-hot-seat-shane-morris-concussion, archived at http://perma.cc/8WB9-
V2TM. 
171 Id. 
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substitution.172  He made just one more incomplete pass before being 
replaced, only to return two plays later.173  When criticized for 
mishandling Shane’s concussion, Michigan head coach Brady Hoke 
claimed that “[Shane] wanted to be the quarterback . . . if he didn’t want 
to be, he would have come to the sideline, or stayed down.”174  Coach 
Hoke’s nonsensical logic, Shane Morris’ conviction to remain in the 
game, and the NCAA’s noticeably absent response, all epitomize the 
NCAA’s pervasively flawed Concussion Policy.175 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The NCAA’s Concussion Policy is an unworkable solution to a 
calamitous issue.176  The meticulously drafted Policy appears to allocate 
the NCAA’s concussion liability to member institutions.177  In turn, the 
institutions apportion responsibility of concussion recognition to the 
student-athletes.178  Yet, the NCAA’s repeated promise of protection, 
                                                 
172 Id. 
173 Mark Sandritter, Brady Hoke ‘Confident’ Michigan Acted Correctly in Playing an Injured 
Shane Morris, SB NATION (Sept. 28, 2014, 9:22 PM), http://www.sbnation.com/college-
football/2014/9/28/6860739/brady-hoke-shane-morris-concussion-injury, archived at 
http://perma.cc/HGJ6-9N93. 
174 Mark Snyder, Brady Hoke Questioned for Handling of Shane Morris Injury, USA TODAY 
(Sept. 29, 2014, 11:41 PM), available at http://www.usatoday.com/story/sports/ncaaf/ 
2014/09/28/brady-hoke-shane-morris-injury-michigan/16390915/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/6BA7-8AMC. 
175 See Jon Solomon, Brady Hoke Defends Actions After Shane Morris Hit to the Head, CBS 
SPORTS (Sept. 29, 2014, 10:56 AM), http://www.cbssports.com/collegefootball/writer/jon-
solomon/24730378/brady-hoke-defends-actions-after-shane-morris-hit-to-the-head, 
archived at http://perma.cc/6CLC-YENS [hereinafter Hoke Defends Actions] (criticizing the 
NCAA’s unenforceable plan).  Solomon relays:  “Even if the NCAA determined that 
Michigan mishandled Morris' situation, it's not clear what, if anything, the NCAA could 
do . . . [s]chools and the NCAA have been fearful of liability issues by putting in 
enforceable requirements.”  Id.; Paul Anderson Consulting, LLC, An ‘Appalling’ Saturday, 
NFL CONCUSSION LITIG. (Sept. 28, 2014), http://nflconcussionlitigation.com/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9Q45-QMDK (expressing distaste for the NCAA, Michigan, and Brady 
Hoke’s reaction).  “The NCAA has failed.  Michigan has failed.  Brady Hoke has failed.  
Shane Morris was abused.  His health and safety was recklessly disregarded.  And for 
what?  Michigan was taking a shellacking.  Morris’ brain and body took a needless 
beating . . . Hoke’s response punctuates why the NCAA’s concussion policy is a failure.”  
Id. 
176 See Wolverton, supra note 71 (“[The failed concussion system] is such an urgent 
problem that the national governing body needs to step up, . . . a clear situation where 
athletes need to be protected, and they’re not being protected.”) (quoting Chris Nowinske’s 
criticism of the NCAA) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
177 See supra note 93 and accompanying text (delegating responsibility to the member 
institution under the Division I Manual). 
178 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12 (asserting that member institutions 
allocate concussion diagnosis to the student-athlete); LSU STUDENT ATHLETES, supra note 
149, at 32 (articulating that a student-athlete is equally as responsible for concussion 
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coupled with the contractual language, instead articulates a shared 
responsibility to protect the student-athlete from head injuries.179  
Nevertheless, neither the member institution nor the NCAA is 
upholding its duty to protect the athlete.180  In fact, both the Association 
and its members unscrupulously attempt to circumvent their obligations 
in order to avoid liability.181  Ironically, it is this contravention that has 
imposed the very accountability the NCAA was trying to avoid.182 
This Part examines the current NCAA Concussion Policy’s 
inadequacy and establishes the contractual liability that arises from its 
intentional defectiveness.183  First, Part III.A addresses how the NCAA’s 
drafting of the Policy, coupled with its illusion of protection, established 
its legal liability.184  Then, Part III.B analyzes how the NCAA’s 
apportionment of accountability and ineffective implementation resulted 
in its failed performance.185  Although the NCAA continuously 
reaffirmed its commitment to protecting student-athletes throughout its 
existence, it unfortunately systematically failed to perform its duty when 
it was most essential.186 
                                                                                                             
recognition as trained medical personnel); UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS 
CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 (illustrating that student-athletes are to sign a 
an acknowledgment form that accepts responsibility for disclosure). 
179 See infra Part III.A.1 (analyzing the contract language and extrinsic evidence that give 
rise to the NCAA’s liability). 
180 See Patchesky, supra note 72 (exemplifying this failure with Derek Sheely’s death); 
supra note 56 and accompanying text (illustrating the Association and member institution’s 
inaction). 
181 See supra note 123 and accompanying text (articulating that the student-athlete is 
responsible for his concussion); supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing whether 
to use shall or should so to avoid liability). 
182 See infra Part III.B (explaining the NCAA’s failed performance); see also supra notes 51–
53 and accompanying text (elaborating on the implied duty of good faith and fair dealing). 
183 See infra Part III (establishing how the failed plan caused the NCAA and member 
institutions to breach their contractual obligations). 
184 See infra Part III.A (interpreting the NCAA legislation). 
185 See infra Part III.B.1 (demonstrating NCAA’s failed performance in allocating 
oversight to the member institutions); infra Part III.B.2 (establishing that the NCAA 
breached when it apportioned concussion recognition and disclosure to the student-
athlete). 
186 See supra notes 31–34 and accompanying text (conveying the history of the NCAA’s 
creation); supra notes 66–92 and accompanying text (illustrating the NCAA’s continued 
promise of health and safety); supra notes 64 (demonstrating the NCAA’s continued 
inaction after the death of Derek Sheely); supra note 93 and accompanying text (evidencing 
that the 2015 revisions still neglect enforcement). 
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A. Flea Flickering a Façade 
The NCAA Concussion Policy is, essentially, a fallacy.187  However, 
its lack of enforcement does not negate that it is a legally binding 
document.188  Thus, when the Association drafted the Policy to hold 
member institutions responsible for protecting against head injuries, it 
reaffirmed its commitment to safeguarding the athlete’s well-being.189  In 
doing so, the NCAA promised student-athletes that they would receive 
appropriate care for head injuries.190  Yet, the Association continuously 
evaded enforcement and apportioned oversight of concussion 
management to the very institutions that needed overseeing.191  Next, 
this Note analyzes the concussion legislation to establish a third-party 
beneficiary status in the student-athlete, despite equivocation in the 
agreement.192 
The NCAA is contractually liable to keep its commitments made to 
the student-athletes under the NCAA legislation.193  However, in order 
to hold the NCAA accountable for its role in the concussion legislation, 
                                                 
187 See supra notes 76–77 and accompanying text (illustrating the NCAA never intended 
to enforce its policy); Hypocritical to the Core, supra note 77 (affirming that the NCAA has 
never enforced its policy).  The Director of Enforcement reasoned that enforcing a 
suspension or penalizing a coach for playing a concussed athlete would be inappropriate.  
Id. 
188 See supra Part II.D (establishing that courts have held a contract exists between the 
NCAA and member institutions, to which student-athletes have third-party beneficiary 
status); Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 623–24 (Colo. App. 2004) (providing the student-
athlete’s third-party beneficiary status to the contract); Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 
796–97 (N.D. Ill. E. Div. 1997) (referring to the NCAA and all members as having a 
contractual relationship); see also Wolverton, supra note 71 (demonstrating that a member 
institution has yet to be charged with violating the concussion policy). 
189 See generally supra Part II.B (delineating the drafting process of the NCAA Concussion 
Policy); Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 33, 34, 42 (providing internal emails discussing 
what language should be used in the Concussion Policy). 
190 See infra Part III.A (establishing third-party beneficiary status in the student-athlete).  
See generally supra text accompanying notes 66–68; 76–77 (pronouncing the NCAA’s 
commitment to student-athlete safety). 
191 See Hoke Defends Actions, supra note 175 (criticizing the University of Michigan for not 
implementing enforceable requirements, thus jeopardizing Shane Morris’ health); see also 
MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64 (providing “[a]n active member institution shall 
have a Concussion Management Plan for its student-athletes”); infra Part II.C.2 (presenting 
the conflicting incentives of member institutions and its agents). 
192 See infra Part III.A.1 (interpreting the NCAA’s Constitution and bylaws). 
193 See Bloom v. NCAA, 93 P.3d 621, 623–24 (Colo. App. 2004) (demonstrating when 
liability arises); see, e.g., supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text (discussing cases that 
found student-athletes have third-party beneficiary status under NCAA legislation).  
“[T]he NCAA's constitution, bylaws, and regulations evidence a clear intent to benefit 
student-athletes.  And because each student-athlete's eligibility to compete is determined 
by the NCAA, we conclude that Bloom had standing . . . to contest the meaning or 
applicability of NCAA eligibility restrictions.”  Bloom, 93 P.3d at 623–24. 
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an intentional benefit must first be established.194  Thus, further 
interpretation of the concussion legislation is required to determine 
whether the NCAA is contractually liable under the policy.195  For this 
determination, an analysis of the contract language, as well as all 
extrinsic circumstances surrounding the agreement, must be 
employed.196 
The NCAA legislation delineates that student-athletes are correct to 
assume sponsors of intercollegiate athletics will reasonably minimize 
any risk of injury resulting from his participation.197  Accordingly, the 
NCAA drafted its Concussion Policy in an attempt to perform its 
obligation of reasonably minimizing the inherent risk of head injuries in 
intercollegiate football.198  In addition to implementing concussion 
guidelines, the Association further promised that it would also enforce 
its Concussion Policy by investigating and punishing members that are 
in violation of the legislation.199  Accordingly, under the NCAA 
Concussion Policy, member institutions are required to implement 
concussion protocols established by the NCAA and abide by any 
decisions the Association makes pertaining to the concussion 
legislation.200  As courts have previously held, third-party beneficiary 
status is evidenced if, under a promise in the NCAA legislation, 
“member institutions agree to let the NCAA set the criteria and to abide 
by the NCAA’s final [] decision.”201  Therefore, in drafting the 
Concussion Policy, the NCAA has committed itself to ensuring student-
                                                 
194 See McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362 (1st Cir. 1994) (discussing the need to 
demonstrate an intentional benefit for third-party beneficiary status). 
195 See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796–97 (1997) (distinguishing intent from 
incidental). 
196 See, e.g., Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 714 (D. Vt. 2012) 
(explaining that both the language of the document and extrinsic circumstances are 
considered to determine intent). 
197 MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2. 
198 See supra note 67 and accompanying text (discussing the NCAA Concussion Policy’s 
initial drafting). 
199 MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 63. 
200 See UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 8–9 
(illustrating the acknowledgement form coaches and medical personnel must sign, 
agreeing to abide by the NCAA Concussion legislation); Investigating and Reporting NCAA 
Violations, supra note 44 (providing the document agents of member institutions must sign, 
acknowledging their compliance with the NCAA legislation); MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra 
note 56, at 2, 63 (“A violation of Constitution 3.2.4.17 shall be considered an institutional 
violation per Constitution 2.8.1; however, the violation shall not affect the student-athlete’s 
eligibility.”). 
201 Knelman, 898 F. Supp. 2d at 715 (citing Oliver v. NCAA, 920 N.E.2d at 200).  As a result 
of these requirements, student-athletes intentionally benefit; therefore, can enforce any 
assurances made under the contract.  Id. 
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athlete well-being by implementing concussion protocol and expressly 
instituting a punishment for noncompliance.202 
Outside of the actual contract language, the NCAA also extrinsically 
affirms its role as an organization that protects student-athletes from 
head injuries.203  First, the Association was established as an oversight 
and enforcement body to protect student-athletes by regulating college 
football programs and ensuring that athletes were protected from fatal 
head injuries.204  The NCAA has maintained its status as the gatekeeper 
of safety and continued assurer of protection throughout its existence.205  
Moreover, the Association continued to acknowledge its commitment to 
student-athlete safety when it drafted the NCAA Concussion Policy.206 
By implementing a Concussion Policy and instituting a punishment 
for noncompliance, it acknowledged the criticality of concussion 
management and assured that student-athletes would be protected from 
such injury.207  After drafting the policy, it proclaimed that securing a 
                                                 
202 See generally DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 347 (committing itself to student-
athlete well-being); see also McCarthy v. Azure, 22 F.3d 351, 362 (1st Cir. 1994) 
(demonstrating that third-party beneficiary status arises when the contracting parties 
intend to bestow a benefit); supra note 47 and accompanying text (elaborating on 
circumstances necessary for determining an intentional benefit) 
203 See supra Part II.A (demonstrating the control the NCAA has over member institutions 
with regard to violations and penalties of student-athlete safety); see, e.g., Emails Raise 
Questions, supra note 24 (illustrating the conversations between NCAA staffers when 
deciding to implement a concussion policy); Letter from David Klossner, supra note 74 
(conveying that student-athlete well-being is essential to the NCAA); Wolverton, supra note 
71 (providing language from the NCAA that under no circumstances should an athlete 
return to play the same day). 
204 See Smith, supra note 22, at 10–11 (providing a historical background of college 
football violence); CROWLEY, supra note 23, at 9 (articulating that the NCAA was created to 
protect college athletes from football deaths). 
205 See NCAA Sports Science Institute, Health and Safety, NCAA, 
http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety, (last visited Mar. 15, 2015), archived at 
http://www.ncaa.org/health-and-safety (conveying that the NCAA Sports Science 
Institute “is devoted to . . . [the] best practice guidelines that will benefit the safety, 
excellence and wellness of the intercollegiate student athlete”). 
206 See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text (showing the correspondence between 
Dr. Klossner and Kristen Sheely).  In his 2012 letter, Dr. Klossner asserted that one of the 
NCAA’s core missions is to provide student-athletes with a safe environment for 
competition.  Letter from David Klossner, supra note 74; supra notes 86–88 and 
accompanying text (evidencing the NCAA’s updated guidelines to improve concussion 
safety). 
207 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (evidencing that the policy was implemented 
as a result of external pressure to protect the athlete); supra Part II.A (demonstrating the 
control the NCAA has over member institutions with regard to violations and penalties); 
see, e.g., Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (illustrating the conversations between NCAA 
staffers when considering the Concussion Management Plan and evidencing its reluctance 
to accept liability). 
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safe environment for student-athletes was one of its “core principles.”208  
Moreover, the NCAA further reaffirmed this commitment when it 
amended the Concussion Policy to enact more stringent guidelines.209  In 
doing so, the NCAA further dedicated itself to defending the student-
athletes’ well-being, under the guise of legislating its members.210  Thus, 
evidencing its intent to ensure student-athletes are protected under the 
NCAA Concussion Policy.211 
Correspondingly, although the NCAA Concussion Policy does not 
affect eligibility, student-athletes still stand to directly benefit from its 
performance.212  Without enforcement of the contractual promises, a 
student-athlete is left to not only recognize when he sustained a 
concussion, but also to convey this information to an often unreceptive 
coach.213  This type of self-reporting, without safeguards, leaves the 
student-athlete susceptible to unreasonable punishments, aggravated 
injuries, and possibly even death.214  Accordingly, enforcement of the 
contractual promises would undoubtedly directly benefit the student-
athlete; thus, creating third-party beneficiary status in the athlete and 
imposing a duty on the NCAA to perform its contractual obligations 
under the NCAA Concussion Policy.215 
                                                 
208 Letter from David Klossner, supra note 74. 
209 See supra note 84 and accompanying text (providing the revised NCAA Concussion 
Policy). 
210 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 347 (committing itself to the student-athlete’s 
well-being). 
211 See Hall v. NCAA, 985 F. Supp. 782, 796–97 (1997) (conveying determinative factors of 
incidental and intentional benefits).  But see NCAA Guidelines on Head Injuries Fall Short, 
supra note 93, at A16 (denouncing the NCAA’s newly drafted guidelines for lacking 
oversight and enforcement); Strauss, supra note 86 (illustrating Judge Lee’s concern with 
the NCAA’s enforcement of its concussion policy). 
212 See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 63 (“violation shall not affect the student-
athlete’s eligibility”); see also supra Part II.B (illustrating the devastating effects of a 
concussion and the importance of proper diagnosis and treatment).  It could be argued that 
the Policy purposefully omitted any negative effect on eligibility to avoid legal liability, as, 
to date, courts have only found third-party beneficiary status when eligibility is affected.  
See Knelman v. Middlebury Coll., 898 F. Supp. 2d 697, 715 (D. Vt. 2012) (stating that third-
party beneficiary status under the NCAA legislation is confined to eligibility claims). 
213 See supra note 101 and accompanying text (demonstrating the impossibility of 
concussion diagnosis, even for an educated medical personnel); supra notes 158–61 
(providing the conflicting incentives of college coaches). 
214 See supra Part II.C (illustrating the impossibilities student-athletes face without NCAA 
oversight); see also supra note 75 and accompanying text (demonstrating how the NCAA’s 
inaction attributed to Derek Sheely’s death). 
215 See Wolverton, supra note 71 (articulating the importance of enforcement); supra note 
50 and accompanying text (affirming that upon establishing intent, third-party beneficiaries 
may seek to enforce the contract after the rights vest).  In the present case, these rights 
vested with the student-athlete’s signed affirmation that he has read the NCAA Division I 
Manual and acknowledges he is responsible for disclosing concussion symptoms.  See 
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Unfortunately, the NCAA’s performance has been noticeably 
flawed.216  When the Association attempted to delegate its duty to the 
member institutions, it created an inconsistent system of protection.217  
First, the NCAA both negligently allowed noncompliance and 
knowingly ignored its promise of protection by declaring that it would 
punish those who systematically violated the Policy while, in practice, 
never actually investigating even seemingly blatant disregard.218  
Further, the NCAA abandoned its duty to protect student-athlete’s well-
being by delegating responsibility of concussion recognition, diagnosis, 
and disclosure to the student-athlete; therefore, deviating from its 
express promise, as well as its implied duty of good faith and fair 
dealing under the contract.219 
B. Poor Performance 
Illogicalities arise when looking at the NCAA Concussion Policy.220  
A member institution is charged with creating and implementing a plan, 
while monitoring itself to assure it is not in violation of the policy.221  In 
turn, an athlete is responsible for recognizing, diagnosing, and disclosing 
his concussion, which is challenging even to trained medical 
personnel.222  Accordingly, contradicting incentives of coaches, athletic 
                                                                                                             
UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 (providing 
an example of the acknowledgement form).  The student-athletes rights may additionally 
vest if he is injured because of his detrimental reliance on the NCAA’s promise of 
protection or upon filing a lawsuit.  Olson v. Etheridge, 686 N.E.2d 563, 570 (1997). 
216 See supra notes 73–74 (documenting NCAA agents’ statements that the organization 
has no intention of enforcing the legislation, thus protecting the athlete). 
217 See NCAA Guidelines on Head Injuries Fall Short, supra note 94, at A16 (criticizing the 
new guidelines, while arguing that “[p]rotecting students should be a higher priority”); 
Wolverton, supra note 71 (illustrating that oversight is lacking); supra note 172 and 
accompanying text (exemplifying its inconsistency). 
218 See Sheely Complaint, supra note 72, at 23 (quoting NCAA’s Director of Enforcement 
that only “systematic or blatant disregard for the plan that would indicate a lack of 
institutional control”); infra Part III.B.1 (elaborating on the impracticality of a self-
monitoring system); see also Patchesky, supra note 72 (demonstrating that neither the school 
nor the NCAA investigated Derek Sheely’s death). 
219 See supra Part II.B.1 (providing background on contract analysis); infra Part III.B.2 
(analyzing the NCAA’s disregard for student-athlete safety). 
220 See supra Part II.C (demonstrating the conflicting incentives of the coaches and 
student-athletes). 
221 See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 8; supra notes 64–68 and accompanying text 
(discussing the self-reporting system); Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (illustrating that 
creations of plans are arbitrary and that inconsistency arises from member institutions 
having this responsibility). 
222 See infra Part III.B.2 (elaborating on the impracticality of allocating responsibility to the 
student-athlete). 
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trainers, and student-athletes impede success of the current Policy.223  
Therefore, while a properly implemented system may have sufficed for 
acceptable performance of the NCAA’s “core mission,” the intentionally 
vague and indiscriminately enforced plan instead constitutes inadequate 
performance.224 
1. Intentional Grounding 
As a response to societal pressure, the NCAA scrupulously redrafted 
its legislation to include a guise of protection, yet never actually intended 
to implement its enforcement responsibility.225  Although the NCAA is 
ordinarily the monitoring and enforcement body of college athletics, its 
Concussion Management Policy has no reliable system to ensure that 
member institutions are conducting concussion screening or following 
their Concussion Management Plans.226  The NCAA has instead 
contended that enforcement is the responsibility of the member 
institution.227  However, the member institution is not likely in the best 
position to monitor itself for concussion management.228  Thus, several 
                                                 
223 See supra Part II.C (discussing the implications that arise from the conflicting 
incentives). 
224 See Letter from David Klossner, supra note 74 (relaying that providing a safe 
environment for the student-athlete is part of the NCAA’s “core mission”); Emails Raise 
Questions, supra note 24 (contending that the NCAA has yet to, nor does it have any intent 
to, actually enforce or punish an institution for noncompliance).  
225 See Arrington Memo, supra note 25, at 33–34 (demonstrating the NCAA’s discussion of 
the pressure to implement a policy); Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (quoting the 
NCAA’s Director of Enforcement).  See generally RODGER GOODELL, 2013 OFFICIAL PLAYING 
RULES OF THE NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE 48 (2013), available at http://static.nfl.com/ 
static/content/public/image/rulebook/pdfs/2013%20-%20Rule%20Book.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/NTA9-PSFB (defining intentional grounding).  “It is a foul for intentional 
grounding if a passer, facing an imminent loss of yardage because of pressure from the 
defense, throws a forward pass without a realistic chance of completion.”  Id. 
226 Vaughan, supra note 67 (conveying that member institutions still have discretion as to 
enforcement); Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (demonstrating that the NCAA has no 
intent to enforce the policy). 
227 MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2; see NCAA’s Concussion Culture Rooted in 
Denial, supra note 71 (quoting the NCAA Director of Enforcement that “it would not be 
appropriate for enforcement to suspend or otherwise penalize a coach . . . even if the 
student-athlete was required to participate after having been diagnosed”); Wolverton, 
supra note 71 (citing the NCAA’s Chief Medical Officer’s contention that the NCAA has no 
authority to demand implementation of its concussion policy). 
228 See Marsh & Robbins, supra note 55, at 668–69 (contending that athletic departments 
often afford football programs greater leniency because of their profitability); McCaskey & 
Biedzynski, supra note 123, at 12 n.9 (finding that member institutions may be held liable 
for the tortious conduct of the coach). 
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contradictions arise when considering the NCAA’s attempted 
enforcement of its concussion management policy.229 
Since the NCAA Concussion Policy’s implementation, a member 
institution has yet to report a violation to the NCAA, absent any public 
awareness.230  Presumably, the institution does not want to show lack of 
institutional control, nor does it want to be charged with a possible 
infraction.231  Similarly, an institution could likely be subjected to 
additional litigation if it were to report a negligent coach; thus, 
incentivizing it to conceal violations of its concussion policy, regardless 
of its commitment to the NCAA.232 
Likewise, coaches and medical personnel are expected to report any 
possible infraction, yet both have contradictory abilities and interests.233  
Many coaches are unable to recognize a concussion due to unmandated 
concussion education.234  Therefore, coaches may unwittingly allow a 
concussed player to remain in play, naïvely jeopardizing the athlete’s 
well-being.235  Assuming the coach is properly educated in concussion 
management, he may nevertheless be deterred from disclosure by salary 
increases or possible termination of employment.236  As a result, the 
coach often is more incentivized by winning than by ensuring an 
athlete’s safety.237 
Moreover, although, medical personnel are undoubtedly the most 
medically qualified in concussion diagnosis, yet unfortunately they, too, 
have conflicting interests.238  Athletic trainers often feel pressure from 
                                                 
229 See supra Part II.C (providing further discussion on the contradictions present in 
college football). 
230 See supra note 71 and accompanying text (discussing the failed reporting system). 
231 Marsh & Robbins, supra note 55, at 668. 
232 McCaskey & Biedzynski, supra note 123, at 12 n.9 (maintaining that member 
institutions may also be liable for the coaches’ actions). 
233 See LSU STUDENT ATHLETES, supra note 149, at 32 (allotting responsibility to the 
athlete); UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 
(providing the Concussion and Injury Reporting Acknowledgement Student-Athlete Concussion 
Statement that each athlete is to sign, indicating he accepts responsibility for disclosure); 
UNIV. UTAH SCH. MED., supra note 123, at 8 (demonstrating that disclosure of concussion 
symptoms is the athlete’s responsibility). 
234 Perceived Coach Support, supra note 98, at 320. 
235 See id. (conveying the criticality of a coach’s concussion education).  Baugh affirms, 
“Ensuring that [coaches] have the knowledge to positively affect the concussion 
identification and management process is critical.”  Id. 
236 See Baumbach, supra note 156 (conveying that coaches are often influenced by bonuses 
and salary increases). 
237 Id. See generally Hughes, supra note 150 (contending a coach is often driven by 
adrenaline, thus unable to make qualified medical decisions). 
238 See Wolverton, supra note 71 (discussing the medical staff’s subordinate position); 
Rigby et al., supra note 161, at 640 (demonstrating the conflicting interests of the medical 
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coaches to return an athlete to play quicker than medically 
appropriate.239  Additionally, employment hierarchy complicates return-
to-play decisions as many coaches have influence over the personnel’s 
employment.240  Therefore, the medical personnel are forced to weigh 
employment retention against the student-athlete’s health—a conflict 
that inhibits the athletic trainer from effectively performing his duties.241  
Accordingly, a member institution is unfortunately incapable of self-
policing with regard to concussion management.242 
Thus, the NCAA failed to perform its duty when it delegated 
member institutions the responsibility to introduce, implement, and 
enforce the Concussion Policy.243  Although self-reporting is the standard 
enforcement system of the NCAA, the Association failed its duty by 
never actually requiring execution of the plan.244  In fact, despite several 
athletes sustaining life-altering head injuries and others succumbing to 
their concussion, the NCAA has yet to investigate any of these 
incidents.245  The Association had a duty to perform its promise of 
protecting student-athletes, yet it failed by createing a knowingly flawed 
system that delegated oversight to member institutions and made 
student-athletes responsible for concussion reporting.246 
2. Institutions Call an Audible 
Unfortunately, the NCAA also failed to perform when it 
recommended allotting the responsibility of concussion diagnosis to the 
most vulnerable party in the contractual agreement.247  Student-athletes 
                                                                                                             
personnel); supra notes 162–69 and accompanying text (elaborating on the conflictions of 
the medical personnel). 
239 Wolverton, supra note 71. 
240 Id. 
241 See id. (providing the conflictions that prevent athletic trainers from removing an 
athlete from play if medically appropriate). 
242 See generally Wolverton, supra note 71 (illustrating the member institution’s inability to 
police concussions). 
243 See supra note 80 and accompanying text (demonstrating the NCAA’s motivation 
behind implementing a plan, while allotting responsibility of its enforcement to the 
member institutions). 
244 See Sheely Complaint, supra note 72, at 23–24 (quoting Chris Strobel’s admission that 
the NCAA does not enforce the concussion policy). 
245 See, e.g., Patchesky, supra note 72 (providing that every authority, including the 
NCAA, failed Derek Sheely). 
246 See generally MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64 (demonstrating the 
apportionment of accountability); supra note 77 and accompanying text (illustrating the 
NCAA’s desire to remove itself from any liability). 
247 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12 (quoting the NCAA Concussion Policy 
that it is the responsibility of the student-athlete to acknowledge he has received the proper 
forms and that he has the duty to report a concussion to medical personnel); supra Part II.C 
(illustrating the conflicting incentives of the student-athlete). 
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were designated the important task to self-diagnose and report a 
concussion.248  However, several competing factors play into the athlete’s 
ability to fulfill its role.249  Self-incentives and outside forces deter an 
athlete from guaranteeing his health and safety is protected.250  
Nevertheless, the NCAA still determined the student-athlete was in the 
best position to fulfill the most critical role under the contract.251 
The current Concussion Policy mandates that student-athletes 
acknowledge it is their responsibility to report concussion-related 
injuries to a medical staff member.252  However, an athlete is the 
individual least able to make an informed diagnosis.253  First, student-
athletes receive inconsistent education on concussion diagnosis and 
management.254  Moreover, the student-athlete is incentivized by fear of 
scholarship loss, desire to play in the NFL, and need to maintain his 
masculine ideology.255  All create a confliction unique to the student-
athlete, hindering his ability to perform the obligation imposed on him 
by the NCAA.256 
Arguably, student-athletes are uneducated as to prevention, 
diagnosis, treatment, and long-term effects of head injuries.257  The 
NCAA publishes concussion guidelines in its Medicine Handbook, yet it 
fails to distribute the publication to the athletes.258  Thus, the 
responsibility to educate the athletes is left to the discretion of the 
                                                 
248 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12. 
249 See supra notes 123–54 (detailing the conflictions of the student-athlete, which include 
his desire to play professionally, to uphold his masculinity, and to maintain his 
scholarship). 
250 See supra note 113 (listing athletes whose lives were permanently impacted from 
concussions). 
251 DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12. 
252 MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 64; see LSU STUDENT ATHLETES, supra note 149, 
at 32 (affirming this responsibility); UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS CONCUSSION 
GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 (conferring responsibility on the athlete). 
253 See Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 124 (demonstrating an athlete is 
not likely to disclose a concussion “despite acknowledging they had received formal 
education in concussion”); Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015 (providing that football players are 
more likely than other athletes to remain playing after being concussed). 
254 See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2 (illustrating that the NCAA Concussion 
Policy, although demonstrates the signs and symptoms of a concussion, is not distributed 
to student-athletes); Kroshus, supra note 126 (finding that the education system is arbitrary 
and ineffective). 
255 See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1009–18 (providing the socio-ecological influences on 
concussion reporting). 
256 See supra Part II.C (providing further context on the student-athlete dichotomy).  
257 Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 124. 
258 See MEDICINE HANDBOOK, supra note 56, at 2 (omitting student-athletes from the 
distribution list). 
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member institution.259  However, there is no enforcement mechanism to 
ensure the member institutions are actually complying with the NCAA’s 
required guidelines.260  Therefore, the member institutions arbitrarily 
decide not only whether to educate the athletes, but also to what extent 
the athletes should be educated.261  However, even with proper 
education and the recently enhanced media coverage of the potential 
catastrophic results of concussions, student-athletes are still not in the 
best position to appreciate the risk.262 
Assuming an athlete has been educated on the devastating effects of 
a head injury, he is unlikely to willfully remove himself from 
competition.263  Concussion symptoms alone produce a neurological 
state of confusion, delayed cognitive ability, and impairment of problem 
solving capability; therefore, physiologically hindering an athlete’s 
ability to make a sound health decision.264  Moreover, an athlete rarely 
considers the long-term repercussions of his decisions in the heat of 
competition.265  Yet, unfortunately, the most significant consequences of 
concussions often arise much later in life.266  Therefore, it is unlikely that 
an athlete is considering the long-term risk of ‘shaking it off’ with the 
short-term benefits of remaining in the competition.267  This is especially 
true as athletes are incentivized by football-contingent scholarships, NFL 
expectations, and masculine ideology.268 
                                                 
259 See Fuhrmeister, supra note 155 (demonstrating the NCAA contends that it “attempts 
to educate schools on how to properly keep their players safe, but it’s up to said schools to 
actually implement the proper precautions and create a safe environment”). 
260 See Emails Raise Questions, supra note 24 (delivering that the NCAA Concussion Policy 
remains unenforced, despite evidence of enforcement in the language); Vaughan, supra 
note 67 (establishing the lack of enforcement). 
261 See id. (illustrating that due to this lack of enforcement and the NCAA’s admitted 
powerlessness, the member institutions can arbitrarily do what they wish without 
repercussions). 
262 See Concussion Symptoms and Return to Play, supra note 54 (illustrating that student-
athletes will admittedly remain in play even though he has been educated as to the 
negative side effects). 
263 Id. 
264 See supra notes 103–04 and accompanying text (demonstrating the immediate effects of 
a concussion). 
265 See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015 (explaining that athletes often remain in play while 
concussed because they do not appreciate the head injury’s seriousness). 
266 See supra notes 107–13 (articulating the long-term effects of concussion and illustrating 
the devastating effects of chronic traumatic encephalopathy). 
267 See generally supra note 128 and accompanying text (illustrating an athlete’s disregard 
of the significance of his head injury). 
268 See supra Part II.C (elaborating further on the student-athlete’s conflictions). 
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A student-athlete’s lack of control over his financial situation further 
impedes concussion disclosure.269  Student-athletes’ are often given 
scholarships that are conditioned upon participation in the sport and 
considered binding on the athlete.270  As a result, athletes are forced to 
participate, unable to withdraw from the sport even if it is in his best 
interest.271  Foregoing a scholarship is simply not a realistic option for the 
athlete who is only able to attend college because of financial aid.272  
Moreover, an athlete is further confined by the National Letter of Intent, 
which compels an athlete to remain at his particular institution for at 
least one year.273  Thus, if an athlete has a coach who is unwilling to 
implement a concussion plan, which compromises his safety, the athlete 
is unable to transfer without sacrificing his scholarship.274 
Furthermore, the NCAA’s delegation of responsibility is illogical 
because student-athletes often hide injuries due to the stigma attached.275  
Athletes have been known to continue playing, despite an injury, out of 
fear placed upon them by a coach.276  Student-athletes overwhelmingly 
                                                 
269 See Huma, supra note 143 (arguing that the NCAA and college presidents create 
conditions for the student-athletes so that they remain indebted to both institutions). 
270 See Frequently Asked Questions About the NCAA, supra note 144 (explaining that 
Universities can cancel athletic scholarships at anytime if the athlete “[q]uits the team for 
personal reasons”); see also Cozzillo, supra note 147, at 1300 (conveying that several courts 
have held the NLI is binding on the student-athlete); Wolverton, supra note 71 (stating that 
concussion underreporting is attributable to an athlete’s fear of having his scholarship 
revoked). 
271 See generally DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 196 (conveying that member 
institutions can reduce or cancel financial aid for voluntarily withdrawing from a sport for 
personal reasons); LSU STUDENT-ATHLETES, supra note 146, at 5 (demonstrating language 
from the member institution that allows it to revoke a student-athlete’s scholarship). 
272 Huma, supra note 143; see also Taylor Branch, The Shame of College Sports, ATLANTIC 
(Sept. 7, 2011, 11:28 AM), http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2011/10/the-
shame-of-college-sports/308643/, archived at http://perma.cc/8ZHJ-H3EG (recognizing 
that most of these athletes are intentionally impoverished). 
273 See Burke & Grube, supra note 147 (providing that under the National Letter of Intent 
a student-athlete is unable to retract his commitment to the athletic program without the 
risk of losing his scholarship and being penalized for breaching the agreement); Plaintiffs 
Want Judge Removed, supra note 146 (describing a movement to eliminate the one-year 
scholarship agreement to alleviate pressure on the athlete). 
274 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 196 (indicating that an athlete cannot leave 
for voluntary reasons or his scholarship can terminated). 
275 See Kerr, supra note 98, at 1015 (relaying that “athletes may believe reporting 
concussions is stigmatizing”); Lillibridge, supra note 115 (illustrating that an injury has a 
stigma attached to it at any level and athlete’s often hide their injured status as a way to 
continue playing without repercussions). 
276 See Brown, supra note 143 (demonstrating the fear coaches attempted to instill in their 
athletes by threatening to cut an athlete from the team if he got hurt); Burnsed, supra note 
150 (indicating that coaches have more influence over any other factor as to whether the 
college athlete perceives his experience as positive or negative); Steinfeldt, supra note 153, 
at 257 (warning of the influence that coaches have on their athletes).  C.f. Sheely Complaint, 
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report that they have previously not disclosed a concussion in fear of 
being removed from a game and ultimately losing their starting spot.277  
Certainly, a demotion in position also jeopardizes an athlete’s chance of 
being recruited by the NFL.278  Competitiveness, societal influences, and 
proper education all interfere with the player’s ability to properly 
diagnose and remove himself from the competition; yet, the NCAA 
continues to unreasonably place responsibility on the student-athlete to 
voluntarily diagnose and disclose his concussion.279 
The NCAA attempted to avoid contractual liability by distancing 
itself from the implementation of its Concussion Policy.280  However, the 
NCAA evidenced its intent to protect student-athletes from head injuries 
in the contract terms and in its actions.281  Nevertheless, the Association 
knowingly delegated this duty to the member institutions that have 
conflicting motivations.282  Therefore, although the institutions are 
required to ensure the NCAA Concussion Policy is properly 
implemented, they are instead actually perpetuating its indifference.283  
In turn, the member institutions, as encouraged by the NCAA, allot 
responsibility of voluntary concussion disclosure and diagnosis to the 
very individuals that need protection.284  It is because of the illogical 
allocation of its responsibility that the NCAA inevitably breached.285 
                                                                                                             
supra note 72 (giving an example of a team policy that threatened loss of playing time for 
disclosing an injury). 
277 See Malinauskas, supra note 160 (finding that injured athletes frequently cite fear of 
being brushed aside by coaches as a negative consequence of injury); see also Brown, supra 
note 143 (exemplifying this by elaborating on the conditions at Washington State where 
there was a feeling of punishment for being injured; thus, an athlete would frequently 
“hide his injury because he [did not] want to lose his spot”). 
278 See Lillibridge, supra note 115 (delivering that the same stigmatization is true of 
injuries in the NFL where club executives would “avoid players with that label like the 
plague”). 
279 See supra note 91 (providing the revised concussion policy, which still instills that 
student-athletes are responsible for diagnosis, without ensuring any safeguards); supra Part 
II.C (revealing the student-athlete’s contradicting incentives). 
280 See supra notes 77–80 and accompanying text (displaying the NCAA’s discussion 
regarding how to best avoid liability while still implementing a plan). 
281 See supra Part III.A (articulating further analysis as to the NCAA’s promise to protect 
student-athletes). 
282 See supra Part III.B.1 (assessing the NCAA’s delegation of duty to the member 
institutions). 
283 See supra Part III.B.2 (illustrating that the member institutions apportioned diagnosis 
and concussions to the student-athletes, as encouraged by the NCAA). 
284 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12 (apportioning liability to the student 
athlete under the NCAA Concussion Policy); LSU STUDENT ATHLETES, supra note 123, at 32 
(allocating recognition and disclosure to the athlete); UNIV. OF MIAMI DEP’T OF ATHLETICS 
CONCUSSION GUIDELINES, supra note 68, at 7 (exhibiting that each student-athlete must sign 
an acknowledgement of his responsibility); UNIV. UTAH SCH. MED., supra note 123, at 8 
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IV.  CONTRIBUTION 
The NCAA created the dichotomy that failed Jordan Matthews.  In 
establishing a loosely drafted Concussion Policy, the Association 
affirmed its commitment to safeguarding the student-athlete’s well-
being.  However, it purposefully negated its promise of protection by 
delegating concussion recognition, diagnosis, and disclosure to those 
who were least able to fulfill the requirement, while doing little to ensure 
implementation.286  By drafting a system that mandated oversight and 
enforcement, while refusing to monitor its enforcement, the NCAA 
indisputably failed the student-athletes.  Correspondingly, redrafting 
and reimplementation is necessary to guarantee that the NCAA no 
longer violates its contractual obligations and, most importantly, that the 
student-athletes are no longer placed in imminent peril. 
A. The Game Plan 
The NCAA’s Concussion Policy must first be revised so that an 
athlete’s eligibility is affected by nondisclosure.  Under the current 
policy, various socio-ecological influences incentivize athletes to refrain 
from disclosing concussion symptoms.  Conditioning eligibility on 
disclosure will instead persuade an athlete to reveal even the slightest 
indication of a concussion.  It will additionally eliminate an athlete’s fear 
of retaliation for disclosing an injury and resolve any threat to his 
playing position.  Moreover, it will ensure that a concussed athlete is 
removed from play for the appropriate time in order to guarantee he is 
fully healed from his head injury. 
The redrafting would simply change language from “violation of 
Constitution 3.2.4.16 shall be considered an institutional violation per 
Constitution 2.8.1; however, the violation shall not affect the student-
athlete’s eligibility” to a violation of Constitution 3.2.4.16 shall be 
considered an institutional violation per Constitution 2.8.1; additionally, 
violation of such shall affect the student-athlete’s eligibility.  Under the 
redrafted policy, only intentional nondisclosure will be penalized and 
will not apply to an athlete who unwittingly fails to disclose his 
symptoms.  This will guarantee that an athlete is not punished for a 
member institution’s failure to provide adequate education.  Moreover, 
                                                                                                             
(affirming the student-athlete’s responsibility); see also supra Part III.B.2 (evidencing a need 
to protect student-athletes). 
285 See generally Bernard v. Rockhill Dev. Co., 734 P.2d 1238, 1240 (Nev. 1987) (defining a 
breach of contract as a “material failure of performance of a duty arising under or imposed 
by the agreement”). 
286 See DIVISION I MANUAL, supra note 40, at 11–12 (demonstrating that enforcement is 
delegated to institutions). 
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the athlete shall disclose his symptoms to independent medical 
personnel who are present at every game, as further established in the 
Proposed Concussion Policy. 
Second, an unaffiliated medical specialist, such as an athletic trainer, 
should be on the sidelines at every NCAA sanctioned event to oversee 
all potential concussion cases during gameplay.  This individual would 
have no attachment to any member institution and would be required to 
remove players that exhibit signs of a concussion from the game.  The 
independent medical specialist would have unquestioned authority over 
any individual within the athletic programs and would receive 
compensation from the NCAA.  The compensation would constitute a 
small fee in terms of annual revenues produced by massive televisions 
and radio broadcasting contracts and could be implemented as a 
provision of those contracts.  Moreover, the independent medical 
specialist would not eliminate medical personnel affiliated with the 
team, but would act as a monitoring body at each game to ensure that all 
of the presently conflicting incentives are reduced and possibly 
eliminated. 
Finally, a systematic revision of the NCAA’s enforcement branch 
must occur to ensure compliance with the Proposed Policy.  The NCAA 
should first undertake a rigorous annual scientific evaluations of rules, 
techniques, and standards in reducing concussions.  Additionally, the 
NCAA should develop a board of unbiased experts from various health 
fields including physicians, public health specialists, neuropsychologists, 
and various other research specialists to review all current protocols.  
The panel’s responsibilities would include compiling the most current 
data on concussions to implement stringent management systems on the 
field, as well as off the field treatments.  The panel will be funded, each 
year, by contributions from member institutions as an increase in its 
membership fee.  The institutions will be required to pay a percentage 
deemed appropriate based upon the annual revenue of its football 
program.  Thus, this model will allow contributions without crippling 
smaller programs’ athletic budgets. 
The current design and regulation of the NCAA Concussion Policy is 
indifferent at best.  The inherent nature of a concussion and the culture 
of football deter athletes from making informed, voluntary decisions 
about their health.  Moreover, teams are likely to adhere to the pressure 
of coaches and a desire to win without any repercussions from the 
NCAA.  The Proposed Policy will increase the likelihood of both 
disclosure and treatment of head injuries, saving an athlete from a 
potentially life threatening hit.  Additionally, employing independent 
medical personnel at each game will assure that concussion diagnosis 
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and treatment is allocated to an individual best able to make an informed 
decision.  Finally, an independent governing body will guarantee that 
the proposed policy is being implemented and that those in violation are 
in fact subject to penalties. 
B. Defensive Strategies 
Several arguments may arise in opposition of this Proposed Policy.  
First, opponents may argue that the Policy will be ineffective because 
athletes will continue to be persuaded by their coach, as well as their 
own internal aspirations and ideology, regardless of eligibility 
implications.  Opponents may further contend that coaches ultimately 
retain discretion over playing time, therefore creating an additional 
impediment by forcing an athlete to sit out for possibly a minor injury 
while additionally risking his spot on the team.  However, this is 
inaccurate. 
While an athlete will likely always retain the drive to remain in play 
regardless of any detrimental health consequences, the proposed policy 
seeks to counteract of this mentality by creating a system that 
incentivizes an athlete to disclose concussion symptoms.  This is 
effectuated not only through a risk of losing eligibility, but also through 
the implementation of an independent medical authority with ultimate 
discretion.  Additionally, if an athlete does properly disclose his 
symptoms, he is only removed from play if it is determined that he has 
sustained a concussion.  Therefore, it is assured that the athlete is 
receiving adequate post-concussion care and any effect on playing time 
is an inferior concern.  Finally, a coach who retaliates against an athlete 
for concussion disclosure will ultimately be in violation of the Proposed 
Policy by hindering its implementation; thus, subject to penalties. 
Next, others may argue the Proposed Policy will not work because 
concussion research is in its infancy.  The extent of damage that 
immediate and long-term impacts have on the brain is still contested and 
the susceptibility of certain individuals to concussions, as compared to 
others, remains unknown.  Thus, opponents may further contend that 
the impact of the plan will be minimal, as even educated medical 
personnel cannot conclusively determine if an athlete has sustained a 
concussion.  Nevertheless, the third-party medical personnel will greatly 
limit the occurrences of concussions, as the individual is formally 
educated on concussion recognition and diagnosis; therefore, eliminating 
any impact that inadequate education has on disclosure and treatment.  
Correspondingly, the medical specialist will be able to affirmatively 
determine the severity of an injury rather than simply disregarding any 
symptoms, as is currently the case. 
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Although the inherently violent, man-making culture of football will 
arguably never be eliminated, the Proposed Policy will help to alleviate 
some of the most unfortunate consequences that result.  Under the 
Proposed Policy, a student-athlete will be more incentivized to disclose 
his symptoms to ensure that his eligibility is not affected.  Additionally, 
the independent medical specialist will guarantee that no concussion-
causing hit will go unexamined.  Finally, the proposed policy will assure 
that the NCAA is upholding its promise to protect those most vulnerable 
in college football. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
 Jordan Matthews was a casualty of the current NCAA Concussion 
Policy when he readily sacrificed his physical and mental well-being for 
his team, just as any athlete would.287  Evidently, the win at 
Vanderbilt’s fingertips was more important than Matthews’ health.288  
Ultimately, however, Vanderbilt lost.289  In his post-game interview, 
Matthews contended that the vomiting was likely due to rehydrating 
with intravenous (“IV”) fluids in the third quarter.290  Whether an IV or 
a concussion prompted his nausea is irrelevant.291  A symptomatic, star 
athlete was allowed to remain in play without ever undergoing 
concussion testing—an increasingly familiar situation with an often 
unfavorable outcome.292 
The current NCAA Concussion Policy must be revised to alleviate its 
ineffectiveness and ensure added safeguards.  The NCAA must redraft 
                                                 
287 See Kevin Kaut et al., Reports of Head Injury and Symptom Knowledge Among College 
Athletes:  Implications for Assessment and Educational Intervention, CLINICAL J. SPORTS MED. 
213 (2003) (“Of considerable concern is the tendency [of athletes] to play while 
symptomatic (e.g. headache, dizziness) and the failure to report symptoms while playing—
especially among football players”). 
288 Jonathan Guenther, When Winning is Everything, JONATHAN GUENTHER BLOG (Aug. 31, 
2013), http://www.jonathanguenther.com/blog/2013/08/when-winning-is-everything/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/D8VV-L9K8. 
289 Vanderbilt Commodores Schedule 2013, ESPN, http://espn.go.com/college-
football/team/schedule/_/id/238/year/2013/vanderbilt-commodores (last visited May 
19, 2015), archived at http://perma.cc/36CG-6DRS. 
290 Lockridge & Cole, supra note 5. 
291 See, e.g., Petchesky, supra note 6 (criticizing Matthew’s lack of recovery time).  “What's 
worrying is that he wasn't out for nearly long enough for Vanderbilt staff to give him the 
mandated concussion tests.  Was he knocked silly?  We don't know.  But Vandy didn't 
either.”  Id. 
292 See Isaac Rauch, “What A Man”:  Reactions to the University of Arizona’s Negligent 
Treatment of Matt Scott’s Concussion, DEADSPIN (Oct. 28, 2012, 11:03 AM), 
http://deadspin.com/5955530/what-a-man-reactions-to-the-university-of-arizonas-
negligent-treatment-of-matt-scotts-concussion, archived at http://perma.cc/8TWQ-8RBW 
(criticizing quarterback Matt Scott’s reentry after two blows to the head followed by 
profuse vomiting); Sandritter, supra note 173 (elaborating on Shane Morris’ quick return). 
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the current Policy to make eligibility contingent upon an athlete 
reporting his concussion symptoms in order to disincentivize 
nondisclosure, as well as minimize outside influences on his reporting.  
Moreover, unassociated medical specialists should be provided at each 
game to reduce the occurrence of multiple head traumas and to eliminate 
the added pressure of coaches and member institutions on an affiliated 
medical personnel’s return-to-play decisions.  Finally, the newly 
implemented system must be annually evaluated to ensure athletes are 
receiving the most effective treatment.  Thus, creating a system that 
allows the NCAA to perform the very duty it was created to maintain. 
At the end of the day, it’s football.  When the game is on the line, 
most athletes would likely make the same decision as Jordan Matthews.  
However, it is a decision that should not have been Matthews’ to make.  
Therefore, although the culture of football may never change, and it may 
always maintain a man-mutilating, money-making, gladiatorial 
reputation, death by football is can undoubtedly be a curable evil. 
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